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Abstract 
 
TURKEY’S DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS UNDER EUROPEAN UNION’S  
CONDITIONALITY: AN INDEX ASESSMENT OF DEMOCRACY,  
GOVERNANCE AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 
 
 
Eunice Cociorvan 
M.A. Thesis, 2015 
Thesis Advisor: Fuat Keyman 
 
Keywords: Conditionality, Democracy, EU, Governance, Index, Reforms 
 
Turkey’s democracy has experienced a disruptive pattern of consolidation attempts 
throughout its history. The Europeanization project, envisioned since the establishment 
of the Republic, has been one of the main drivers for reform, especially in the early 2000s, 
when the EU membership prospect gained momentum. Although the conditionality’s 
credibility had rather diminished, Turkey’s Justice and Development Party demonstrated 
that a constitutional democracy can be achievable in a predominantly Muslim society, 
despite external and domestic challenges, provided the benefits are greater than the 
implementation costs. This study draws attention to Turkey’s democratization patterns in 
the policy areas on which the European Union’s political conditionality relies—
democracy, governance, and human rights, notably after the official start of the accession 
negotiations in 2005. 
The main objective of this study is to assess the country’s democratic progress between 
2005 and 2013 by examining Turkey’s standing according to international indices. Thus, 
it is explored whether the post—2005 period fostered substantial progress and whether a 
positive development is foreseeable in the ongoing democratization path. 
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Özet 
 
AVRUPA BIRLIĞI UYUM ŞARTLARI ALTINDA TÜRKIYE'NIN 
DEMOKRATIKLEŞME SÜRECI: DEMOKRASI, YÖNETIM VE INSANI 
GELIŞMIŞLIK INDEKSI DEĞERLENDIRMESI 
 
 
Eunice Cociorvan 
Yüksek Lisans Tezi, 2015 
Tez Danışmanı: Fuat Keyman 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Avrupa Birliği, Demokrasi, Islahat, Indeks, Uyum Şartları, Yönetim 
 
Türkiye, tarihi boyunca, demokrasiyi topluma yayma mücadelesinde karışık bir süreç 
yaşamıştır. Avrupalılaşma – ya da Batılılaşma – hareketi, Cumhuriyet’in ilanından bu 
yana, özellikle Avrupa Birliği üyeliği olasılığının hız kazandığı 2000’li yılların 
başlarından beri, reform için temel unsurlardan biri olmuştur. Üyelik şartlarına karşı 
güven oldukça azalmış olsa da, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, anayasal demokrasinin 
Müslüman çoğunluklu bir toplumda, ülke çıkarının, uygulama maliyetlerinden daha 
yüksek olması koşuluyla, iç ve dış zorluklara rağmen sağlanabileceğini gösterdi. Bu 
araştırma, politik çerçevede özellikle 2005’teki resmî katılım müzakerelerinin 
başlangıcından sonra, demokrasi, insan hakları ve yönetim gibi Avrupa Birliği şartlarına 
dayanan Türkiye’nin demokratikleşme modeline dikkat çekmektedir. 
Araştırmanın temel hedefi, uluslar arası verilere göre ülkenin durumunu inceleyerek 2005 
ve 2013 yılları arasında Türkiye’nin demokratikleşme sürecini değerlendirmektir. 
Böylelikle, 2005 sonrası dönemin önemli bir gelişim gösterip göstermediği ve süregelen 
demokratikleşme yolunda olumlu bir gelişimin öngörülebilir olup olmadığı ortaya 
çıkarılacaktır. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
An increasing number of studies have committed to analyzing Turkey’s democratic 
credentials, as throughout its recent history, it has proven that, although democracy can 
be broadly compatible with a predominantly Muslim country, it is also dependent on a 
series of domestic and international variables, provided the right incentives and popular 
support are aligned.1 
Throughout its republican history, Turkey’s modernization project involved playing an 
active role by integrating with international organizations. Turkey’s belonging in Europe 
has been openly proclaimed by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and has legitimized a series of 
political, social and economic reforms modeling the Western civilization, despite the fact 
that modernization from above did not necessarily reflect adherence to democratic 
values.2 Modern Turkey’s history has been characterized by the coexistence of success—
the establishing of a necessary institutional structure of modernity, such as a nation-state, 
modern positive law, parliamentary democracy, market economy and citizenship—and 
failures, in ensuring a multi-cultural modernity, a consolidated democracy, stable and 
sustainable economy, as well as an inclusive citizenship operating on the basis of 
language of rights and freedoms.3 
Whereas Turkey’s quest for European Union (EU) membership dates back to 1959, when 
it had first applied for associate membership, over 50 years have passed since, without 
fulfilling its EU accession project.  Having the EU membership as a goal to work towards 
has been argued to make Turkey's domestic articulation of reforms much more concrete.4 
However, despite being granted the candidate status in 2005, Turkey’s enthusiasm for 
democratic reforms’ adoption and implementation has significantly decreased, in contrast 
to the radical changes implemented in the 2000s.5 As of 2014, although Turkey is still 
formally standing by the EU membership bid, the negotiations have been informally 
hindered, a development which has been interpreted to signal a decreased commitment 
on both sides.6 Some of the explanations for this slowdown rely on domestic factors 
(Saatçioğlu, 2014; Jacoby, 2010) such as the costs of reforms under decreased public 
                                                          
1 Keyman; Öniş. 2007 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid., p 9 
4 Keyman, 2009 
5 Kubicek, 2011, p 135 
6 Saatcioğlu, 2014, p. 96 
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support for Europeanization, while other approaches account for external factors such as 
changes in Turkey’s foreign policy or the EU’s absorption capacity (Pridham, 2007). 
This thesis acknowledges that there is a diversity of frameworks and determinants for 
evaluating a country’s democratization performance by relying on internal or external 
variables, and attempts to examine Turkey’s democracy pattern by referring to 
international non-governmental monitoring agencies’ democracy indices. For this 
purpose, the first part of the thesis will introduce the European Union and the membership 
conditions, along with its rule enforcement mechanisms, namely accession conditionality 
and external governance. The second chapter will bring forth a historical overview of 
Turkey’s democratization process and its EU accession development. The third chapter 
will introduce the relevant international indices measuring Turkey’s standing on policy 
areas such as democracy, governance and human development. The fourth part will 
examine Turkey’s rankings on democracy indices whereby last chapter will draw the 
concluding remarks. 
 
Theoretical Framework 
The word ‘democracy’  has been increasingly used throughout various segments of 
society, regardless of their education, religious affiliation or occupational field, as it has 
become a common concept in the mundane vocabulary, notwithstanding the public and 
political usage. Commitment to democracy is one of the fundamental preconditions for 
any country to be considered eligible for application to EU membership.  
Democracy is both a politically loaded term and an abstract concept.7 The conceptual 
framework frequently used for assigning the concept to contemporary political regimes 
by varied monitoring agencies emphasize the institutional role and the civic involvement, 
by regarding Robert Dahl’s definition of democracy as involving popular participation 
and electoral competition for major public offices, and a host of institutions and processes 
necessary to sustain participation and competition.8 
Although there is a broad range of understandings of democracy and its socio-political 
implications, the current thesis refers to democracy as the set of principles promoted by 
the EU in its acquis communautaire. Whereas the EU does not postulate a clear-cut 
definition of democracy, its meaning can be derived from the principles used to describe 
                                                          
7 Rose, 2008, p 254 
8 Dahl, 1971 in Rose, 2008 
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its features. The EU’s annual assessment of a country’s democracy employs a broad range 
of criteria, narrowed down to democracy, good governance, and respect for human rights. 
As the Treaty on the European Union states, “these values are common to the Member 
States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity 
and equality between women and men prevail.”9 
The EU Report’s democracy assessment entails the evaluations under sub-sections for the 
parliament, government, public administration, civil-military relations, judicial system, 
anti-corruption policy, as well as the implementation of human rights and protection of 
minorities. The freedom of expression is evaluated under ‘civil and political rights’ within 
the framework of human rights. While the concepts evaluated are not specifically defined, 
it is stated that “the candidate country must have achieved the stability of institutions 
guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of 
minorities”.10 The fact that new indicators, such as the anti-corruption policies, have been 
added in time, maybe used to indicate that EU’s definition of democracy is constantly 
broadening.11 
The global significance attributed to democracy and good governance for a country’s 
affairs has also prompted intergovernmental policymakers, international 
nongovernmental organizations and social scientists to seek indicators that can be used to 
evaluate the performance of regimes. Whereas indicators of democracy and of 
governance may prove to be interchangeable, rather than incommensurable or in 
conflict,12 measuring the commitment to democracy indicates a consistent understanding 
of democracy, as well as of the subsequent indicators.  
. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
9 TEU, Art. 2 
10 TEU, Art. 1 
11 Džihić; Wieser, 2011, p 1805 
12 Rose, 2008, p 251 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
 
The European Union has become an increasingly present reference in the international 
contemporary political discourse, owing to its influential cultural and geopolitical role 
throughout the past decades in Europe. A large body of literature has centered on studying 
the underlying mechanisms of EU’s sociopolitical, economic and foreign policy 
dimensions, as well as the multidimensional dynamics of the EU integration process 
(Grabbe: 2002; Manners: 2013; Rose: 2008; Schimmelfennig: 2008). In examining 
Turkey’s progress on strengthening democracy, as postulated by the EU’s accession 
conditionality, it is instrumental to understand the EU’s institutional framework and the 
core values underpinning its relationship with member states and candidate countries 
alike. This chapter will thus introduce the EU in historical perspective, outlining the main 
features of the accession process, by referring to the integration mechanisms of legal 
conditionality and external governance. 
 
 
1.1. From the European Coal and Steel Community 
Towards the European Union 
 
The political actor known today as the European Union represents a geopolitical entity, 
as well as a legal organization, which has evolved from a political and economic 
international organization– the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) – toward 
the larger organization that it is today.  
Following the unfavorable consequences of the World War II, and one year after the 
establishment of the Council of Europe in 1949, the ECSC emerged as a new political 
and economic organization that would unite European countries in order to safeguard 
lasting peace and promote economic expansion, sharing a common market, common 
objectives, and a common institution.13 The Treaty of Paris had thus been signed in 1951 
by six countries – Italy, Spain, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, and West Germany, 
                                                          
13 Treaty Constituting the ECSC, Art. 1, 2 
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and was to be accompanied by its first two institutions – the High Authority and the 
Common Assembly.14  
However, in light of existing security concerns, raised by failed endeavors at creating 
defense and political communities, two more European bodies had been established upon 
signing the Treaties of Rome in 1957 – the European Economic Community (EEC), and 
the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM),15 whereby the extension of 
European integration was to include enhanced general economic cooperation.16 7 years 
later, however, in order to centralize the three European organizations, the Merger 
Treaty had been signed in Brussels in 1967, thus having created the European 
Communities17 that would function under a single Commission and a single Council. 
After several Treaty amendments, and with a number of newly integrated member states, 
The Maastricht Treaty, effective in 1993, brought forth key features of a political union, 
by officially laying foundation of the European Union, along with new forms of 
cooperation between EU governments.18 The institutional structure of the EU relied on 
three main pillars – the European Community, common foreign and security policy, and 
justice and home affairs, whose congruity was to be guaranteed by a single institutional 
framework, namely the European Council of Heads of State, the Council of Ministers, the 
Commission, the European Parliament and the Court of Justice.19 
Following subsequent legal revisions and amendments brought forth by the Treaty of 
Lisbon (effective in 2009), the EU’s three pillar organizations stipulated by the Maastricht 
Treaty had been replaced with an ordinary legislative procedure,20 which was to be 
incorporated into all its deriving policies, with the exception of police and judicial 
cooperation on criminal matters where the Member State has a right of initiative and a 
right of appeal to the European Council on legislative matters.21 
Whereas the EU’s early objectives primarily focused on economic and political 
cooperation, references to liberty, democracy, respect for human rights, and fundamental 
                                                          
14 Ibid. Title II, Art. 7 
15 EEC Treaty, 1957 
16 The consolidated version of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, 2010, 
Art. 1, 2 
17 Centre Virtuel de la Connaissance sur l'Europe, p 2 
18 Maastricht Treaty, 1992. Title I, Article A 
19 Characteristics of the Treaty on European Union, 2012, p 2 – retrieved from 
http://www.cvce.eu/obj/characteristics_of_the_treaty_on_european_union-en-beec7a53-4023-412d-a1ab-
2c31b6a3c39d.html on 11.12.2014 
20 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European 
Community, 2007. Title I, Chapter 3, Art. 69A.1 
21 Ibid. Title II, Chapter 3, Art. 65 
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freedoms had not been part of the its legal discourse. Only after the failed attempt to adopt 
a European Constitution and the subsequent adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009, the 
EU’s political and legal discourse progressively expanded toward a wider concept of 
democracy promotion, broadly characterized by adherence to shared values of respect for 
human dignity, freedom, democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights.22 
 
 
1.2. EU Integration and Accession Conditionality 
 
The European construction is a unique historical experience under which, preexisting 
independent states may voluntarily concede some of their prerogatives in favor of 
adopting a supranational entity’s regulations, therefore, from a legal and political 
perspective, European integration takes place as a mutual construction, giving rise to a 
new communitarian and supranational entity (Kubicek: 2011). Unlike international 
cooperation organizations such as OECD, UN, or NATO – which have a primarily 
associative function among sovereign states, the European Union is an organization of 
voluntary integration of sovereign states23 and, while other international organizations 
may rely on simpler forms of coordination, the Treaty of Rome legitimized a legal body 
that overrules national jurisdictions24 by overseeing the progressive policy transfer and 
implementation within Member States.  
The integration basis relies on the Union’s general interest which prevails over national 
interests25—a partial ceding compensated by certain membership advantages, whether 
political or economic. Adhering to the principles established by the EU founding Treaties 
as grounds for the Union’s administration, also accounts for standing by a European 
construction that has drawn inspiration ‘from the cultural, religious and humanist 
inheritance of Europe, from which have developed the universal values of the inviolable 
and inalienable rights of the human person, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of 
law’, as referred to in the Treaty on the European Union. 
A communitarian understanding of the Member States’ role within the European Union 
relies on the intergovernmental dynamics, under which member states serve as the most 
                                                          
22 TEU, Art. 6 
23 TEU, Art. 1 
24 Ibid. Art. 51 
25 Ibid. Title I, Art. 2—6  
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appropriate and legitimate political communities for sharing the European communion 
(Wallace: 2006; Hagemann: 2008), yet the EU’s processes involving subjective sharing 
of relationships within and between the economies and societies of the member states, are 
more than the co-operative relations between EU governments, as the ‘Europeanization’ 
and globalization of European economies and societies, involving the reconfiguration of 
public and personal life, transcend intergovernmental cooperation.26  In other 
understandings, the EU functions primarily as a supranational community, whereby the 
legitimate role of institutions such as the European Commission and the European Court 
of Justice is fundamental in understanding its politics and policies.27.  
The EU has also been conceptualized in light of the role of transnational factions and 
groups inside and outside the EU, as relevant and legitimate multidimensional actors 
participating in the European community,28 all the while emphasizing the importance of 
these transnational interactions and interdependencies within the relations among EU 
member states, especially in the more recent globalization-driven geopolitical 
interactions.29 Manners (2013) draws from the brief illustrations from the consolidated 
treaties and points out that “the notion of communion captures the multiple nature of the 
EU as a political object between imagined communities and cosmopolitan enactments - 
where local and global politics commune”30 therefore conceptualizing the contemporary 
features, processes and outcomes of the European Union cannot be merely reduced to 
supranational integration, or intergovernmental co-operation, but ought to be placing the 
communautaire interactions into a more global EU context.31  
Inasmuch as the founding treaties along with the current Constitutional Treaty emphasize 
the shared goals of congruous development promotion, balanced and sustainable 
economic activities, with high employment and social protection, sustainable growth, 
increased level of competition and converging economic performance, as well as with 
social, economic and territorial cohesion among Member States, the bi-dimensional 
integration process that had started half a century ago, in the context of increasing 
globalization, has generated a series of constrains and conditionalities which, 
undoubtedly, impacted the Member states and their common policies, internal market and 
                                                          
26 Lynggaard 2011 in Manners, 2013. 478  
27 Camps, 1956. p 23—25  
28 Strange, 1971. p 311 in Manners, 2013. 
29 Manners, 2013. p 480 
30 Ibid. p 488 
31 Ibid. 
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competition rules, by transforming old structures and interdependencies. 
 
1.2.1. Accession Conditionality 
The certain allure of EU membership, in comparison with that of other international 
organizations, in particular, illustrates the EU’s power to enforce conditionality in return 
for accession prospects.32 In a country’s accession process, the EU conditionality can be 
broadly understood as the series of accession requirements set forth by the EU 
Copenhagen in 1993.  While the EU has undoubtedly undergone a series of legislative 
and procedural amendments, adhering to the acquis communautaire by meeting the 
political conditionality has remained one of the fundamental criteria for a state’s 
fulfillment of membership prerequisites. The conditions set out by Article 49 and the 
principles stipulated by Article 6.1. of the Treaty on European Union to be met by any 
potential candidate country rely on three broad criteria. Meeting the political criterion – 
consolidated institutions to promote democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect 
for and protection of minorities, is the first prerequisite for the European Council to decide 
on opening the negotiations with a country. Additionally, the economic criteria requires 
the existence of a functioning market economy, along with the capacity to cope with 
competitive pressure and market forces within the Union and, last but not least, the 
acceptance of the acquis communautaire stands out as the ability and commitment to take 
on membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary 
union.  
Whereas the EU has been known for its core commitments to promoting democratization, 
political liberalization and its engagement toward respecting human rights33 
conditionality has been proven to be one of the relevant democratization strategies for 
potential member states. The EU conditionality generally relies on a reinforcement by 
reward approach, with the rare use of punishment if a candidate fails to conform to the 
accession criteria. By this means, a social entity uses the instrument of reinforcement in 
order to obtain a desired change in the behavior of another party (Schimmelfennig, 
Knobel and Engert: 2003). If not for the withdrawal of accession benefits as a sanction, 
there is no actual penalty or punishment to influence the cost and benefit calculations of 
the target party, therefore the prospect of future advantages is what rather motivates a 
                                                          
32 Pridham, 2007. p 446 
33 TEU, Art. 2 
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candidate state to implement reforms.34 The EU rewards the target country for complying 
with the requirements, by offering a number of benefits, such as full membership, 
financial assistance or military protection, and withholds the rewards for failing to 
acquiesce them. Conditionality is thus calculated to work when a clear, mutually accepted 
hierarchy between the applicant country and the community is operationalized through 
negotiation between participants with the aim of utility maximization.35  
Once the candidate state finds the conditionality credible and the rewards as plausible, it 
has a more substantial motivation to adopt and implement new political reforms 
(Schimmelfennig: 2008). Effective conditionality, as Kubicek points out, apart from a 
cost-benefit outlook, is also related to its actual credibility, as well as to its strength and 
consistency.36 Credibility, as ‘the expectation that an announced policy will be carried 
out’37 is a measure of EU’s constancy in delivering the applicable compensations drawing 
from the governments’ compliance with the criteria, or their non-compliance with them.  
Even though, according to the Article 49 of TEU, application for membership has been 
an open possibility for any European state meeting the political conditionality and 
committed to adhering to the acquis communautaire, the EU’s actual absorption capacity 
has come up as a key element in its enlargement process. It has been argued that offering 
plausible conditional EU membership prospects is indeed a vital prerequisite for the EU, 
as an anchor that would bring forth significant domestic changes in a non-member state.38 
Turkey has been an example of a candidate state whose actual membership probability 
has been met by a number of challenges and changes in attitude, ranging from enthusiasm 
to reluctance from both sides. Indeed, soon after opening the accession negotiations with 
Turkey, the EU’s 2006 enlargement strategy brought forth new emphasis on cautiousness 
about assuming any new undertakings39– a stance which had been widely interpreted to 
indicate a change in its enlargement standpoint.  
Nevertheless, as Müftüler-Baç argued in 2002, a country’s accession progress should be 
interpreted through a multilateral framework that transcends case specific factors such as 
meeting the Copenhagen criteria, by taking into consideration EU—specific factors such 
as the institutional setup, member state preferences, as well as the role of public opinion 
                                                          
34 Urgan, 2011, p 13 
35 Davies, 2013, p 521 
36 Kubieck, 1999, p 912 
37 Drazen; Masson, 1993 cited in Bronk, 2002, p 6 
38 Schimmelfennig, 2004, p 918 
39 European Commision, 2006 
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regarding enlargement and membership in particular.40 Similarly, Schimmelfennig41 
suggests that the primary aspects of conditionality might be superseded by other 
mechanisms that can also lead to rule transfer, such as the countries’ internal political and 
economic transformations which may coincide with the EU rules, as well as the 
attractiveness of the incentives for reform.42 
 
1.2.2. External Governance 
Another aspect of the EU’s role in promoting democracy and the rule of law has to do 
with exercising its influence toward aspiring members and non-members alike, by 
horizontal co-ordination and co-operation, negotiated in decentralized settings between 
public and private actors (Peters: 2000). 
Lavenex and Schimmelfennig explore the concept of external governance of the EU as 
an extension of its internal rules and policies going beyond formal membership, which is 
able to transform a non-member country’s implementation of European values.43 External 
governance is argued to be surpassing expansion since, in the recent years, the EU 
absorption capacity has been brought up as a potential issue in considering opening new 
accession talks with late potential members, all the while having to address its relationship 
with the neighboring countries in a purposeful way11.  
The formal rules, along with the monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms which are 
crucial for an effective use of conditionality as a top-down policy transfer on the basis of 
incentives are particular to a hierarchical external governance mode.44 In measuring the 
external governance effectiveness, a country’s selecting, adopting and, ultimately, 
applying EU rules in its international and domestic modus operandi may well indicate the 
actual level of commitment to EU conditionality.45  
From an institutionalist hypothesis, the effectiveness of EU external governance is 
directly correlated with the quality of the existing EU institutions (Scott: 1995), whereas 
a power-based explanation argues that the main determining factor is the EU’s power and 
its interdependence to third countries, which are usually quick to adhere to the acquis 
communautaire.46 A third explanation would be centered on the domestic structures of 
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the third country whose established institutional mechanisms would determine its 
compatibility with EU rules and, therefore, the effectiveness of external governance.47 
The external governance perspective thus accounts for promoting democratic governance 
at the sectoral level through the projection of the EU acquis.48  While reference to the EU 
acquis has become standard in EU association agreements with third countries, and 
several institutionalized settings have been established to promote these associations, the 
question of how far third countries outside the circle of candidates for membership 
actually adapt to EU norms has remained little investigated. Here effectiveness is defined 
as the extent to which EU rules are effectively transferred to other countries.  
Turkey itself has been a candidate state for which the future membership prospects 
considerably acted as a catalyst for change, especially in the pre-accession phase. 
However, its vigorous initial commitment to adopting core democratic principles in line 
with EU conditionality has been met by additional, informal, accession conditions49, 
which eventually contributed to a diminished credibility in the likelihood of membership. 
At the same time, as Laffan theorized, the EU has taken over the concept of 
‘Europeanness’ by achieving hegemony in terms of increasingly defining what it means 
to belong to Europe.50 From this perspective, having Turkey’s candidacy on hold for the 
longest period of time, coupled with certain member states’ informal reluctance to support 
its membership may well indicate misrecognizing it as a European country. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
DEMOCRATIZATION AND EU MEMBERSHIP 
 
 
According to the EU’s admission criteria, Turkey’s membership prospects are directly 
related to achieving a stable, functioning democracy, by which good governance, rule of 
law and respect for human rights concur with the Union’s intrinsic values. Whereas the 
EU has undoubtedly acted as a catalyst for political reform, particularly after declaring 
its official candidacy, Turkey’s democratic experience, albeit through disruptive patterns, 
began with the early days of the Republic’s establishment, and was carried through in line 
with the ruling elite’s vision of modernity, as a way of modeling Western European 
values. This chapter describes Turkey’s major democratization phases, starting with the 
Kemalist reforms, followed by the ensuing developments under successive military 
governments, and, lastly, refers to the post—2000 reforms, in the context of Turkey’s 
official acceptance as a EU candidate state in 1999. 
 
 
2.1. Turkey’s Pre-Accession Modernization  
 
Turkey has been experiencing a sinuous historical pattern of ties with the Western 
community, notwithstanding various debates on the country’s Europeanness. The 
Kemalist state elites have always looked up to the West as a preferable faction to be part 
of51 and there had been an equal consensus as to the advantages of Europeanization, 
inasmuch as Turkey’s geopolitical belonging in Europe had been an agreed upon.52 
Turkey’s history of modernization and westernization dates back to the 19th century 
Ottoman Empire, when the Tanzimat reformers, heavily influenced by European 
thinking, attempted to adopt a number of administrative reforms between 1839 and 1876, 
but were later stalled as the concentrated authoritarian power was grounded in the ruler’s 
hands. The modern-day Turkey had been established in 1923 under the leadership of 
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, at a time when the Ottoman Empire’s collapse marked the 
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beginning of the 20th century. Atatürk described Turkey’s goal as attaining the level of 
contemporary (Western) civilization and even surpassing it.53 Yet in order for the 
Kemalist-envisioned idea of Turkey to come true, political power had to be taken over 
from the hands of reactionaries and ultraconservatives, a process that marked a new state-
centered polity and society modernization project led by the Republican People’s Party 
(CHP).54  
The Turkish nationalist elite expressly focused on modernization according to their 
perceived Western and European values and, like their Unionist predecessors, they 
believed that political power was to be exercised in order to carry out a social and 
economic revolution without which the political revolution would dissipate.55 Therefore, 
a wave of legal, bureaucratic, economic, military and socio-political reforms had been 
developed and implemented as such. As part of this radical restructuring, Turkey 
abolished the Arabic alphabet in favor of the Latin one, reformed the educational system 
by accelerating the process of literacy and mass education, introduced localized teaching 
and co-education, banned traditional religious methods of teaching, imported Western 
criminal and civil laws, and extended the economic role of women, as well as their right 
to vote and stand for election.56 
In the single-party period of 1923—1945, the Republican People’s Party (CHP) had been 
the main actor to enforce ‘modernization’ in an attempt to advance Turkey’s economic 
and cultural change. Although the system’s authoritarian proneness did not foster 
ideological justifications, it has been a period of radical secularization through social and 
political reforms grounded in the ideal of a liberal-democratic state.57 These policies took 
form under the centralized political power of the republican elite represented by the CHP. 
The party leveraged its monopoly on the political power so as to transform the people 
into republican citizens, eligible to participate in politics. In line with the single-party 
regime’s motto, “for the people, despite the people”, the modernization project was based 
on the economic, political and cultural exclusion of a majority of population living at the 
rural periphery and on rejecting the principle of effective good governance.58 As Özbudun 
pointed out, this sudden, far-reaching change imposed upon society, along with the deep 
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cleavage that emerged between radical secularists and Islamic traditionalists brought 
about a polarizing effect that would not have made a stable democracy likely.59 
Between 1946 and 1960, Turkey experienced a transition to multiparty politics, which 
had been dominated by the CHP and the Democratic Party (DP), the latter having won 
the parliamentary elections of 1950. While under the first years of DP’s leadership Turkey 
experienced looser checks on Islam and significant economic growth, the change had not 
lasted, and the economy had been affected by high inflation and a great debt, accompanied 
by new censorship laws limiting individual liberties. The DP’s clientelist approach, 
however, did not reshape the former social and political structures, but employed them in 
the exchange relationship scheme in a similar manner, thus perpetuating the elitism of the 
previous single-party era.60 
The military coup of 1960 strengthened the power of the military, entailing complete 
autonomy from civilian government by replacing civilian institutions with military 
organs. A year later, upon adopting the constitution of 1961, a new, freely elected civilian 
government came to power. Under such circumstances, in order to limit the elected 
assemblies’ power, a new system of checks and balances had been implemented and, 
along with it, judicial review of the laws’ constitutionality, the strengthening of the 
Council of State, independence for the judiciary, a second legislative chamber, as well as 
increased autonomy to universities and the Radio and Television Corporation.61 Turkey’s 
main democratic features at that time had not been grounded in the principles of rule of 
law, limited state, or division of powers, but amounted to free elections and 
responsiveness within the clientelist network. However, while the liberalized 
environment that followed the military rule achieved easing some of the social and 
political tensions, it nevertheless allowed for marginal and extreme politically-motivated 
acts to take place. At a time when unemployment was rising and certain extremists took 
advantage from the existing social polarization by fueling dissent and lawlessness, 
counteracting such occurred through another military intervention.62   
While civilian administration was had been eventually restored by 1973, the successive 
constitutional revisions that followed in 1971 and 1973 strengthened the executive 
authority and restricted civic liberties that were thought to potentially favor dissent and 
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political extremism. As Özbudun pointed out, the immediate reason behind the military 
intervention was the growing political violence and terrorist acts with large-scale effects 
in society, a development that signaled an upsurge of ideological polarization within the 
country, which, along with the economic and international challenges, prompted a decline 
in the legitimacy of the political system.63 The military’s intervention, however, did not 
succeed at ensuring political stability by means of good governance, nor managed to 
moderate political violence and polarization, let alone achieve economic stability.  
Under such crucial developments, a third military takeover came about in September 1980 
and had kept the ruling power for three consecutive years. The new constitution of 1982 
brought new restrictions on political participation of former leaders, restricted the 
political activities of trade unions, associations and cooperatives, strengthened the 
presidency and introduced the 10% threshold for the political parties to enter the General 
National Assembly. A distinctive feature of the constitution of 1982 has been the 
institution of the Presidency, under which, ‘the President is devoid of any political and 
legal responsibility for his or her actions, except for treason, yet is entrusted with 
enormous authority to act in all matters political, legal, economic, and so on’.64 Civilian 
government had only been restored by 1983, yet the lack of vigorous, economically 
prevalent interests able to thrive despite the state and leverage it in their own interests, as 
much as  the weak corporate intermediary structures had visible and powerful effects on 
the overall modernization process.65 With the subsequent lifting of the martial law, a 
strengthened, independent judiciary had been established in addition to an independent 
press.  
Under the state’s autonomy, however, the power to change the class’ structure and 
dynamics had been unevenly distributed, which resulted in a widened center-periphery 
cleavage. The ideological polarization between left and right, along with the ethnic 
tensions between Kurds and Turks, or between secularists and Islamists, had not been 
addressed by the coalition governments either. As Kalaycıoğlu (2005) pointed out, “the 
military government of 1980–1983 persecuted anyone who had been involved with any 
socialist or social democratic organization or party in the 1960s and the 1970s. Large 
numbers of intellectuals, students, artists, and politicians who had been involved in leftist 
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politics were imprisoned for long periods of time, even when no charges could be pressed 
against them, or fled Turkey, and took refuge abroad”.66 
Whereas the military interference of 1980 was arguably effective, in short term, by means 
of forcefully overcoming the governance crisis of the late 1970s, from a long-term 
perspective, it had stalled Turkey’s trajectory toward EU membership, as the impact it 
had on human rights practices had been devastating.67  
In the early 1990s, Turkey witnessed an increase in political fragmentation and identity 
politics, by seeing the first Islam-oriented party, the Refah Party, win the elections of 
1995, thus empowering politicians outside of the old Kemalist circles68 for forming a new 
coalition government with the center-right True Path Party. However, the RP’s openly 
Islamist rhetoric signaled discontent even among the moderate adherents, while actively 
confronting the State’s secular elements.69 The party’s failure to cultivate diversity and 
foster democratic consolidation was addressed two years later by the military, through 
the 1997 coup.70 The next coalition government formed in 1999 by the Democratic Left 
Party, the Nationalist Action Party, and the Motherland Party also did not succeed in 
fostering effective democratic reforms, but furthered the existing political polarization.  
The year 2002, however, had been a turning point for Turkey’s political environment, as 
the conservative Justice and Development Party (AKP) won the elections and managed 
to gather an increasing solid electoral support that was later to secure its victories for an 
entire decade (2004—2014) by incorporating a proactive foreign policy with a dynamic 
economic liberalization program.71 
In addressing the changing nature of Turkey’s modernity, Keyman and Koyuncu outlined 
a modernity paradox that sees the coexistence of increased economic liberalization, 
characteristic of western modernity, and the emergence of identity politics, traditionalism 
and its appeal to the ‘return to authenticity’72 This paradox is argued to have emerged 
from the legitimacy crisis of the strong-state tradition, characteristic of  the 1980 decade, 
when the state has acted as the sole internal variable for democracy, a process which 
inadvertently alienated a large base of civil society.73 Additionally, the emergence of 
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identity politics in the 1990s articulated a strong critique of the exclusionary secular-
rational model of modernity, prompting a more inclusive political approach, which 
fostered Turkey’s active engagement in the globalization process by completing its full-
membership application to the EU, a constraining factor which has nonetheless generated 
a new political cleavage between pro- and anti-European integration forces.74 
 
 
2.2. Turkey’s Integration in Europe  
 
When the accession negotiations between the European Union and Turkey began on 
October 3, 2005, it had been nearly half a century since Turkey first applied for associate 
membership in 1959.  
Engaging actively with the European political and economic structures had been an 
integral part of Turkey’s early endeavors to take part in the European state system, yet 
this process gained momentum particularly after the World Wars (Ahmad: 1993). 
Turkey’s ‘Western-oriented’ foreign policy outlook surfaced more in the World War II 
aftermath, as, in 1945, Turkey stepped in as one of the 51 founding members of the United 
Nations, a role that secured its relevance on the international political scene. As of 2014, 
the UN’s presence in Turkey has been established through 13 agencies that focus on 
contributing to the country’s national development process by engaging different society 
segments.75  
Turkey also joined the Council of Europe in 1949 – an international human rights 
organization promoting cultural and political principles for democratic development 
across European countries – after, in 1948, it joined the Organization for European 
Economic Development (OEED), where it took part in the implementation of the 
European Recovery Program, which contributed to rebuilding the post-war European 
economy.76 
In 1952, soon after the North Atlantic Treaty Organization had been established, Turkey 
applied for membership and stepped in by taking a strategic role in the Alliance’s defense 
policy, while capitalizing on its geopolitical setting in securing the Western Europe’s 
flank.  
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Two years after the EEC had been founded by the Rome Treaty of 1957, Turkey applied 
for Associate Membership of EEC, which was later granted in 1963, under the 
‘Agreement Creating An Association Between The Republic of Turkey and the European 
Economic Community’, also known as the Ankara Agreement.77 The agreement 
stipulated a three-stage procedure involving preparing a customs union, establishing it 
and, eventually, transitioning toward accession. Whereas the Agreement had come as 
promising step toward EEC integration, the process proved to be challenging due to a 
domestic environment deeply affected by the military interventions of the 1960s and 
1970s. At the same time, in 1973, the newly welcomed member states—Britain, Denmark 
and Ireland—expressed reluctance over Turkey’s prospects for membership, a tension 
that was enhanced by the Cyprus conflict of 1974.78. Under the circumstances brought by 
the 1970s’ crisis, Turkey’s Prime Minister at the time, Bülent Ecevit, decided to freeze 
the Ankara Treaty in 1978, whereby the EU suspended the Agreement in 1982, as a 
response to Turkey’s democracy disruption by the military takeover of 1980. 
After the power shift of 1983 occurred and the military rule established upon 1980’s coup 
had ceased in favor of a civilian government, Turkey applied for full membership in 1987, 
having Turgut Özal as the Prime Minister. Although the application had been rejected, 
Turkey’s political and economic liberalization that took place in the first half of the 1980s, 
positively impacted the country’s European prospects.79 Therefore, the next major 
development in Turkey’s relation with the European Economic Community led to the 
creation of a Customs Union in 1995, which fulfilled the second stage of the Agreement 
– the integration of economic and trade policy required for full membership. Turkey’s 
potential for future membership was later re-addressed in 1999 when the EU, in its 
Helsinki European Council summit, granted Turkey the status of candidate state for EU 
membership. In this context, a new impetus for reform in the country’s domestic policies 
brought forth new commitments toward complying with the Copenhagen Criteria as a 
prerequisite for opening the accession talks. As part of the pre-accession strategy, the 
European Council adopted the Accession Partnership Document for Turkey in 2001, 
which was accompanied by Turkey’s own National Programme for the Adoption of the 
EU acquis, a step that outlined clear objectives to be met and changes to implement.  
The opening of accession negotiations with Turkey had officially been declared in 
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October 2005, at a time when Turkey’s efforts to fulfill the political aspects of the 
Copenhagen criteria already fostered a number of democratization reforms. 
 
 
2.3. Turkey’s Reforms under EU conditionality   
 
2.3.1. The Reforms of 2000—2005  
In 2000, soon after receiving the candidate status for EU membership, Turkey’s Supreme 
Board of Coordination for Human Rights published a set of recommendations for political 
reforms and objectives to be considered so as to comply with the Copenhagen criteria. 
The reforms had focused on offering increased legal protection of social, cultural and 
political rights of all Turkish citizens of different religious and ethnic origins, as well as 
readdressing freedom of expression in Turkey.80 The adopted Constitutional amendments 
set up the abolishment of the death penalty for all circumstances (effective in 2004), 
replacing it with aggravated life sentence, drafted a more liberal Law on Associations 
(which was to be particularly relevant for civil society groups), and changed the infamous 
Article 313 of the Penal Code—largely applied against Islamists and Kurds for ‘inciting 
ethnic or religious hatred’. Additionally, the conditions under which the state could 
restrict the freedom of rights and liberties, as provided by Article 13 and 14 of the 
Constitution had been changed, as well as the punishment for insulting state institutions 
(Article 159).81 
In this period, one third of the Constitution had been revised by the Constitutional 
Amendments of 2001 and 2004. The democratization packages implemented by 2004 
tackled old cleavages between opposing factions such as conservative and secular groups, 
and fostered the emergence of identity politics, a process under which older divisions 
between nationalists and the ethnic minorities, particularly the Kurds, resurfaced. 
A key player in this wave of democratic reforms had been the conservative AKP, which 
won the parliamentary elections of November 2002 and advanced its leader, Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan, as the Prime Minister. Despite its Islamic orientation, the party’s 
discourse at that time had been openly pro-European and supportive of political 
liberalization. The government-established EU Harmonization Commission adopted the 
UN Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social, and Cultural 
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Rights, along with six harmonization packages passed through the parliament in a period 
of two years,82  a series of changes that had significant impact on the country’s political 
environment. 
Notably, one of the biggest constitutional changes brought forth by the adopted 
harmonization packages succeeded in diminishing the semi-authoritarian legacy of the 
previous military governments.83 The Amendments carried out to the 1982 
Constitution—drafted by the military—restored some fundamental rights and liberties, 
the freedom of assembly, and extended the freedom of expression. A number of 
amendments focused on the National Security Council (NSC) – established by the 1961 
Constitution and strengthened further by the 1982 Constitution. In 2001, a change in the 
Article 118 of the Constitution allowed for increasing the number of civilians 
participating in NSC meetings. Whereas by 2000 the NSC used to have the power of an 
upholder of the executive, the seventh harmonization package, entered into force on July 
2003, changed its function to that of an advisory body of the cabinet.84 It also became 
possible to have civilians appointed to the secretarial position (by the Prime-Minister’s 
selection and the President’s approval), and some of the powers of the general secretariat 
were abolished. The eighth harmonization package of May 2004 ensured increased 
civilian superintendence of defense expenditures by increasing the right of the Court of 
Auditors to oversee the budget, as well as of previously-confidential property.85 The 
reform packages also curtailed the role of the military in the judiciary, so by 2004, the 
military courts’ jurisdiction on civilian cases had been drastically decreased. 
The lifting of restrictions on broadcasting in the different languages and dialects, 
traditionally used by Turkish citizens in their daily lives, such as Kurdish, also allowed 
for expanded liberties for the media.86 Under the bylaw, a broadcast period of five hours 
per week for radio corporations and four hours per week for television corporations had 
been instituted. In June 2004, The Turkish Radio and Television Corporation started 
broadcasting in Bosnian, Arabic, Circassian, Zaza and Kirmanchi languages.87 As the 
adopted reforms managed to address key concerns for the freedom of expression and 
association, elimination of torture, curtailing the military’s power, and abolishing the 
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death penalty,88 the EU decided that accession negotiations could begin with Turkey.89 
Whereas the democratic reforms undertaken in the 1990s failed to address the military’s 
role, as much as the Kurdish minority’s rights, the ‘vicious circle of delayed reforms and 
slow progress’90 had been progressively overcome in the pre-accession period by having 
the anchor of EU’s credible accession conditionality. 
 
2.3.2. The 2005—2009 reforms  
While the EU’s 2005 decision to open accession talks with Turkey had initially been seen 
as a promising step toward actual membership, the following years had been marked by 
a decreasing commitment toward implementing the reforms.91 The 2005 Negotiation 
Framework for Turkey re-emphasized the need to address the judiciary’s independence, 
the legal framework for ensuring freedom of expression and association, as well as the 
transparency of the public sector and the respect for minorities and human rights.92 
The EU’s 2006 report on Turkey noted a slowdown in the reform implementation 
progress and stressed the importance of strengthening the individual freedoms and 
committing to good neighborly relations with the United Nation’s Charter, including, if 
necessary, the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice.93 
Under the EC Report, the ‘Cyprus Conflict’ resurfaced, bringing more tension to the 
EU—Turkey relations. The open conflict with Cyprus emerged in 1974 when the 
independent island, who had Turkey and Greece as guarantor powers, had been interfered 
with by a Greek junta. In response, Turkey sent troops to the island, on claims of 
maintaining the stability. This resulted in the island’s partition between Turkish and 
Greek Cypriots. When the northern part declared independence, it was only 
acknowledged by Turkey, a development that fostered social and ethnic cleavages, which 
prompted population exchanges among both countries.94 Cyprus’s application for EU 
membership further entangled its relationship with Turkey (Eralp, 2009), when it had 
become officially accepted as a member state in 2004. This raveled the negotiation terms 
for Turkey, as the “Additional Protocol” previously signed in 1970 entailed the agreement 
to open its airports and seaports to all of the EU’s members, hence to Cyprus as well. By 
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December 2006, Turkey upheld its refusal to open the ports and airports to ships and 
aircrafts under the Cypriot flag. Faced with a candidate state’s refusal to grant entrance 
benefit to a customs union member country, the EC decided to suspend negotiations on 
eight chapters relevant to Turkey’s restriction towards Cyprus (These chapters were: 
Chapter 1: free movement of goods, Chapter 3: right of establishment and freedom to 
provide service, Chapter 9: financial services, Chapter 11: agriculture and rural 
development, Chapter 13: fisheries, Chapter 14: transport policy, Chapter 29: customs 
union and Chapter 30: external relations). In other words, Turkey’s progress toward EU 
membership could not advance lest it solved the Cyprus problem, by implementing the 
2005 Ankara Protocol. 
While this period witnessed a decreased credibility of EU conditionality, certain reforms 
with regard to the fight against corruption and the protection of minorities continued, a 
series of changes that were arguably driven rather by AKP’s political calculations, rather 
than by the sole commitment to comply with the EU conditionality.95  
Among the reforms adopted was the amending of the law on foundations in 2008, which 
significantly improved the property rights of religious foundations established by non-
Muslim minorities in Turkey.96 Furthermore, under pressing demands of the EU, the 
Article 301 of the new Criminal Code had been amended in 2008. The article, previously 
deeming insulting Turkishness and state institutions as punishable offenses, had been 
rewritten so as to allow certain statements to be considered ‘criticism’ rather than ‘insult’, 
and introduced the requirement of the minister of justice’s permission in order to launch 
a prosecution.97 
Despite narrow progresses in 2007 and 2008, the EU agreed to open nine additional 
chapters of the acquis, but the key chapters regarding energy, external relations, as well 
as security and defense matters had been held up by several EU member states.  
By 2008—2009, the European Commission’s reports rendered Turkey’s commitment to 
the accession process as inconsistent and lagging behind on implementation terms.98 
Among the problematic areas, non-compliant with the EU legislation, had been the rules 
on political parties, promotion of minority languages, trade union rights, allegations of 
torture, corruption, non-discrimination on basis of sexual orientation, bans on Internet 
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sites, the use of the Anti-Terror law against Kurdish groups, the lack of a gender equality 
body, and the continued political influence of the military.99 While acknowledging the 
reforms implemented, the EC’s evaluation reports pointed out that the government had 
still been left with a large number of unaccomplished issues. 
One of the changes that Turkey had undertaken concerned its Kurdish minority and 
involved the development of a ‘democratic opening’, as a solution to the decade-long 
tensions and disputes over ethnic recognition and territorial autonomy.100 The changes 
ratified included setting up a Kurdish-language state TV channel in the early 2009 and 
allowed the establishment of private educational institutions to teach Kurdish. Later, in 
2013, the peace process negotiations with the outlawed Kurdish party was to result in an 
agreement for the cease-fire, including disarmament and withdrawal of Kurdish fighters 
from Turkey, as means of calling an end to armed struggle.101  
 
2.3.3. The slowdown between 2010—2014 
The period between 2010 and 2014 has been experiencing an overall slowdown in 
adopting new reforms and democratic packages. Some of the positive changes undertaken 
by Turkey in 2010 had been acknowledged in the EU progress report, which commended 
the lifting of restrictions on broadcasting in languages other than Turkish, the expanded 
judicial reform, and on the fundamental rights improvements, all the while raising 
concerns about Turkey’s slowdown in guaranteeing the freedom of expression, press, and 
religion.102 No new chapters of the acquis were opened in 2011 and little progress was 
noted in the ongoing negotiations. 2011 was also the year when the ruling party, AKP, 
won the parliamentary elections, thus reaffirming its dominance and the popular support 
for its leadership. The positive changes mentioned in the 2011 report referred to the 
progress on strengthening the civilian control of the military, financial services, 
competition policy, religious property and cultural rights, as well as in the judiciary,103 
yet the same concerns for human rights as those expressed in the previous reports had 
been restated. 
In terms of Turkey’s relationship with the EU, the Cyprus conflict arose again, as the then 
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Prime Minister’s rhetoric reiterated the country’s unchanged stance toward recognizing 
it as a state, inasmuch as Cyprus was to take over the EU presidency in 2012.  During the 
six months of the Cypriot EU Presidency in 2012, Turkey’s relations with the EC had 
been officially frozen by Ankara.104 
2012 was the year when Turkey’s accession negotiations with the EU had reached a 
political and technical stalemate, with little anticipation of any additional chapters of the 
acquis communautaire to be opened in the near term.105 However, the “Positive Agenda” 
launched by the EU in 2012 aimed to include legislative alignment, enhanced energy 
cooperation, visas, mobility and migration, Customs Union, foreign policy, political 
reforms, promote  the fight against terrorism and increased participation in people-to-
people programs.106 In the framework of the “Positive Agenda”, a number of working 
groups were set up for eight chapters (3 – Right of Establishment and Freedom to Provide 
Services, 6 – Company Law, 10 – Information Society and Media, 18 – Statistics, 23 – 
Judiciary and Fundamental Rights, 24 – Justice, Freedom and Security, 28 – Consumer 
and Health Protection, and 32 – Financial Control).107 The third Judiciary Reform 
Package establishing new arrangements in order to increase the efficiency of judiciary 
services and addressing the postponement of cases and sentences related to offences 
committed through the press, took effect on 5 July 2012.108 
A number of negotiations chapters that would increase coordination between EU and 
Turkey in achieving accession progress in key policy areas are still blocked by Cyprus 
and France’s veto, and by the EC decision, due to Turkey’s position towards 
implementing the Ankara Protocol. Table 1 indicates the negotiations chapters that are 
being currently on hold by Cyprus, EC and France, respectively. 
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Cyprus European Commission France 
2 – Freedom of 
Movements for Workers 
1 – Free Movement of 
Goods 
11 – Agriculture and Rural 
Development 
15 – Energy  3 – Right of Establishment 
and Freedom to Provide 
Services 
17 – Economic and 
Monetary Policy 
23 – Judiciary and 
Fundamental Rights 
9 – Financial Services 22 – Regional Policy and 
Coordination of Structural 
Instruments109 
24 – Justice, Freedom and 
Security 
11 – Agriculture and Rural 
Development 
33 – Financial and 
Budgetary Provisions 
26 – Education and 
Culture 
13 – Fisheries  34 – Institutions  
31 – Foreign, Security and 
Defense Policy 
14 – Transport Policy  
 29 – Customs Union  
 30 – External Relations  
Table 1. Negotiations Chapters blocked for Turkey by Cyprus, EC and France 
(Source: Turkey’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs) 
 
While France’ veto on chapter 22 on regional policy had been withdrawn in 2013, a 
development that signaled the chance re-launch negotiations, the restart of EU-Turkey 
accession talks had been opposed by Germany,110 after a wave of dissent and protests 
over the re-development of the Gezi park in Istanbul had been met with excessive police 
force in June 2013. The government’s reaction prompted harsh criticism from Brussels 
over the use of force against freedom of assembly and speech. A resolution was adopted 
on June 13 by the European Parliament expressing its “deep concern at the 
disproportionate and excessive use of force by the Turkish police”.111 
The 4th Judiciary Reform Package was adopted by the Turkish Grand National Assembly 
in April 2013. Additionally, grounded in the legislation adopted in June 2012, 
Ombudsman and Human Rights Institutions were established, and the Ombudsman 
started to receive petitions in March 2013.112 As of 2014, the pace of negotiations has not 
substantially changed.  In September, Turkey adopted a ‘European Union Strategy’ 
intended to re-invigorate its accession process, by adopting new constitutional reforms, 
addressing the socio-economic transformation, along with a new communication 
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strategy.113  
While the EU progress report on 2014 acknowledged the implementation of the 2013 
democratization package and the steps taken regarding the Kurdish peace process, it 
raised serious concerns over the independence of judiciary and separation of powers, in 
light of the government’s response to the corruption allegations of 2013.114 The EU’s 
report also pointed out that the attempts to ban social media, later overturned by the 
Constitutional Court, and pressures on the press leading to a widespread self-censorship, 
reflected a restrictive approach to freedom of expression and freedom of association 
alike.115 Moreover, it reiterated Turkey’s need to strengthen the rule of law and to commit 
to respecting the fundamental rights in both law and practice. Last but not least, the report 
stresses the importance of solving the Cyprus issue ‘through constructive statements and 
concrete action’,116 a step that would be crucial for opening new negotiation chapters and 
invigorating the relation between the two parties. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
INSTRUMENTS OF ASSESSING DEMOCRATIC PERFORMANCE 
 
 
According to the EU admission conditionality, in its quest for membership, Turkey’s 
good records at achieving a stable democracy, good governance and respect for human 
rights are considered the fundamental criteria for evaluating its progress, in terms of 
adopting and implementing reforms, so as to align its legislation with the EU acquis. The 
EU’s annual evaluations have been instrumental for understanding Turkey’s democracy 
performance, and have also offered valuable insight into the Union’s own 
conceptualization of democracy. Nevertheless, among the diversity of frameworks for 
assessing democratic performance, a number of international indices and rankings 
produced by democracy monitoring agencies, through yearly surveys and data analyses, 
have been providing valuable assessments of countries’ democratization patterns, 
reflected in the yearly trends. Turkey’s presence in international indices and rankings has 
been recorded on varying time-spans—depending on each index—and its shifting 
position among other states, as well as its overall scores outline worthwhile patterns.  
This chapter introduces the main democracy-monitoring organizations’ indices regarded 
for Turkey’s analysis, as well as the methodology on which they rely, whereas the 
findings will be further discussed in chapter four, along with their implications for 
assessing the conditionality’s impact on the country’s accession prospects. 
 
 
3.1. Democracy Indices  
 
3.1.1. Freedom House  
Freedom House (FH) is a US-based non-governmental organization which has been 
known as a widely used source for annual ratings of a country’s political and civil liberties 
progress. While its initial report in 1950 focused on political trends and their 
consequences for individual freedoms, it has evolved into a larger research body, with a 
periodically revised methodology, featuring a number of country reports and global 
ratings. According to its mission statement, FH’s broad purpose is supporting the 
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expansion of freedom in the world, which is possible ‘only in democratic political systems 
in which the governments are accountable to their own people; the rule of law prevails; 
and freedoms of expression, association, belief and respect for the rights of minorities and 
women are guaranteed.’117  
Freedom House’s criteria for an electoral democracy include: a competitive, multiparty 
political system, universal adult suffrage, regularly contested elections conducted on the 
basis of secret ballots, reasonable ballot security and the absence of massive voter fraud, 
and significant public access of major political parties to the electorate through the media 
and through generally open campaigning.118 
Freedom in the World, Freedom House’s annual global comparative report on political 
rights and civil liberties, comprises numerical ratings, rankings and statuses for 
approximately 195 countries119, alongside other related and disputed territories. The 
related territories are depending on a sovereign state, without being in certain legal or 
political dispute, whereas the disputed territories are areas within internationally 
recognized sovereign states whose status is in serious political or violent dispute, and 
whose conditions differ substantially from those of the relevant sovereign states.120  
The analysts score countries in light of the conditions and events within their borders 
during the coverage period, using a broad range of sources, such as news articles, 
academic analyses, reports from nongovernmental organizations, and individual 
professional contacts.121 The Freedom in the World report classifies countries as ‘free’, 
‘partly free’, and ‘not free’. While this specific designation has been disputed122  because 
it does not classify countries into democracies and non-democracies, but into ‘free’, 
‘partly free’, and ‘not free’ countries, the threshold can be nonetheless explored by 
looking at the numeric indicators. Therefore, the score on which the classifications rely 
ranges from 1 to 7. The composite score is the arithmetic average of two other factors’ 
index – civil liberties and political liberties, which are also evaluated on a 1 to 7 scale (1 
being the most free, and 7 the most authoritarian). Consequently, a country’s composite 
index between 1.00 and 2.50 is defined by Freedom House as free, 3.00–5.00 as partly 
free, and 5.50–7.00 as non-free. Each one of these ratings rely on the scores of subsequent 
                                                          
117 Freedom House, 60 Years Report, 2010 
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indicators as following: the political rights indicators incorporate electoral process, 
political pluralism and participation, and functioning of government scores, whereas the 
civil liberties indicators rely on four subcategories which are freedom of expression and 
belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy and 
individual rights123 
Freedom of the Press has been another report annually released by the Freedom House 
since 1980, covering the freedom of the media in 197 countries and territories around the 
world. ‘The index assesses the degree of print, broadcast, and internet freedom in every 
country in the world, analyzing the events of each calendar year’.124 It provides numerical 
rankings and rates each country's media as "Free," "Partly Free," or "Not Free." Country 
analyses assess the legal environment for the media, along with the political pressures 
that may influence reporting, as well as the economic factors that affect the access to 
information. 
 
3.1.2.  The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) 
The Economist Intelligence Unit’s democracy index attempts to reflect an up-to-date 
assessment of democracy worldwide, for 165 independent states and two territories.  
Unlike the Freedom House democracy indicators which focus primarily on freedoms, the 
EIU Index’s focus emphasizes the elements of political participation and functioning of 
the government. The democracy index, on a 0 to 10 scale, is based on the ratings for 60 
indicators grouped in five categories: electoral process and pluralism; civil liberties; the 
functioning of government; political participation; and political culture. Each category 
has a rating on a 0 to 10 scale, where the overall index of democracy is the simple average 
of the five category indexes, which are based on the sum of the indicator scores in the 
category, converted to a scale of 0 to 10.125  
The threshold points for assessing the regime type ranges between: 8—10 for full 
democracies, 6—7.9 for flawed democracies, 4—5.9 for hybrid regimes, and scores 
below 4 for authoritarian regimes. 
 
3.1.3.  Reporters Without Borders 
Reporters without Borders is a France-based non-profit organization, established in 1985 
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as a press freedom monitoring agency, whose mission is “to denounce any attacks on the 
freedom of information in the media, to act in cooperation with governments to fight 
censorship and laws aimed at restricting freedom of information, to morally and 
financially assist persecuted journalists, as well as their families, and to offer material 
assistance to war correspondents in order to enhance their safety.”126  
The annual World Press Freedom Index attempts to measure the level of freedom of 
information in 180 countries by using data gathered with a questionnaire applied through 
a network of similar international NGOs, journalists and other researchers.127 Each 
country is assessed a score and a rank, which are complementary indicators of the state 
of the press freedom.128 The questions focus on six broad criteria: pluralism, media 
independence, environment and self-censorship, legislative framework, transparency, and 
infrastructure. Using a system of weighting for each possible response, countries are 
given a score of between 0 and 100 for each of the six overall criteria—with 0 being the 
best possible score and 100 the worst.  These scores are then used as indicators in 
calculating each country’s final score. 
 
 
3.2. Governance Indicators  
 
3.2.1. The World Justice Project 
The World Justice Project (WJP) is a US-based independent non-profit organization 
working on monitoring and promoting the rule of law around the world. The Rule of Law 
Index, firstly published in 2009, attempts to reflect complex governance indicators across 
99 countries around the globe with differing social, cultural, economic, and political 
systems.  
The eight indicators of the WJP’s Rule of Law Index—constraints on government powers, 
absence of corruption, open government, fundamental rights, order and security, 
regulatory enforcement, civil justice, and criminal justice-—derive from conceptualizing 
rule of law as a democratic system upholding the government and its officials’ 
accountability, consistency in applying the legislation evenly and transparently while 
protecting the fundamental rights and the security of persons and property, enacting and 
                                                          
126 http://en.rsf.org/who-we-are-12-09-2012,32617.html 
127 Reporters Without Borders, 2014 World Press Freedom Methodology 
128 Ibid. p 2 
 31 
 
enforcing laws in a fair and efficient way, as well as delivering justice equally and 
competently.129  
While the Index values provide a quantitative indication of trends in rule of law, changes 
in the dimension’s variability convey information on the quality of the changes: an 
increase in rule of law may be achieved by improving the performance in specific 
dimensions, while a decrease in the coefficient of variation may be achieved by reducing 
gaps in performance between dimensions.130  
The WJP collects data from delineative samples of the general public (the General 
Population Polls or GPPs) and legal professionals (the Qualified Respondents’ 
Questionnaires or QRQs), so as to measure the Index scores and rankings. Individual 
answers are then mapped onto the 47 sub-factors of the Index (or onto the intermediate 
categories that make up each sub-factor), codified so that all values fall between 0 (least 
rule of law) and 1 (most rule of law), which are later aggregated at the country level using 
the simple (or un-weighted) average of all respondents.131  
 
3.2.2.  Transparency International 
Transparency International is an international non-governmental organization founded in 
Germany in 1993, focusing on monitoring and combating corruption in the governmental, 
business, and international environment. Yearly, the organization publishes two 
international corruption evaluations—the Global Corruption Barometer and the 
Corruption Perception Index. 
The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) was established in 1995 as a composite indicator 
used to measure perceptions of corruption in the public sector in different countries 
around the world. The index relies on data sources from independent institutions 
specializing in governance and business climate analysis.132 After subsequent revisions 
in the previous methodology, the 2014 CPI was calculated using 12 different data sources 
from 11 different institutions that capture perceptions of corruption within the past two 
years.  
The CPI score indicates the perceived level of public sector corruption on a scale of 0 - 
100, where 0 means that a country is perceived as highly corrupt and 100 means it is 
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perceived as very clean. A country’s CPI score is calculated as the average of all 
standardized scores available for that country (minimum three), which is later rounded to 
whole numbers, whereas the country's rank indicates its position relative to the other 
countries and territories included in the index.133 
While the CPI has been widely referenced as one of the most frequently used corruption 
indicators, it has nonetheless been criticized134 for its accuracy, given that the data relies 
primarily on perception-based evaluations, which are ultimately subjective, this bottom-
up evaluation approach has been argued to risk reinforcing other biases as well, thus 
bringing forth a circular understanding of corruption.135 
 
3.2.3. GRECO 
The Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) is a corruption-monitoring 
organization founded by the Council of Europe in 1999, to oversee the States’ compliance 
with the organization’s anti-corruption standards. GRECO membership, based on an 
enlarged agreement, currently incorporates 49 States (48 European States and the United 
States of America), which were joined by Turkey in January 2004. 
Whereas GRECO does not have command over performing corruption measurements in 
each of its member states, the evaluation procedures rely on mutual analysis and peer 
pressure, a process that involve several NGOs’ cooperation. A country’s monitoring 
process requires data collection through questionnaire(s), on-site country visits by which 
evaluation teams gather relevant information from domestic key players. The evaluation 
reports provide progress assessments and recommendations to the evaluated countries in 
order to improve their level of compliance with the provisions under consideration.136  
 
3.2.4. World Bank Data 
The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) published by the World Bank, report on 
six broad dimensions of governance for 215 countries and territories over the period of 
1996-2013. The WGI draw from defining governance as “the traditions and institutions 
by which authority in a country is exercised. This includes the process by which 
governments are selected, monitored and replaced; the capacity of the government to 
                                                          
133 Ibid. 
134 Hawthorne, 2013 
135 Ibid. 
136 GRECO, Rules of Procedure, Title II, Rule 22 
 33 
 
effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and the respect of citizens and the 
state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them.”137  
The WGI are a research dataset summarizing the views on the quality of governance 
provided by a large number of enterprise, citizen and expert survey respondents in 
industrial and developing countries. These data are gathered from a number of survey 
institutes, think tanks, non-governmental organizations, international organizations, and 
private sector firms. In this context, the measured indicators are: voice and accountability, 
political stability and absence of violence/terrorism, government effectiveness, regulatory 
quality, rule of law, and control of corruption.138 
The data on each country is reported in percentile rank terms, ranging from 0 (lowest) to 
100 (highest) worldwide, indicating the percentage of countries worldwide that rank 
lower than the indicated country, so that higher values indicate better governance scores.  
 
 
3.3. Human Development Indices  
 
3.3.1. Human Development Index (HDI) 
Human development entails not only economic development but also social and cultural 
improvements. The United Nations (UN) measures human development throughout the 
World using the human development index (HDI), which is a summary measure of three 
key indicators of human development: income, educational attainment, and life 
expectancy. Whereas the ‘long and healthy life’ dimension is measured by the life 
expectancy indicator, the ‘access to knowledge’ describes the mean years of education 
for adult population, and the expected years of schooling for children. A country’s Gross 
National Income (GNI) per capita is the measure for the living standard. The HDI has a 
maximum rating scale of 100; a HDI of 80–100 denotes “high human development,” 50–
79 denotes “middle human development,” and a HDI score between 0–49 denotes “low 
human development.”139  
The Gender Inequality Index (GII) is another inequality indicator focusing on the gender-
based dimension of human development, by assessing three subsequent indicators—
reproductive health, empowerment, and economic activity in 149 countries. The index 
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reflects the deficiencies in human development due to uneven achievements for both 
genders. Reproductive health is measured by maternal mortality and adolescent birth 
rates; empowerment is valued by the share of parliamentary seats held by women and by 
the achievements in secondary and higher education by each gender, whereas economic 
activity is evaluated by the labor market participation rate for women and men.  
A more recent index, introduced in 2014, has been the Gender Development Index (GDI), 
a sex-disaggregated HDI, determined by the ratio of female to male HDI in areas of 
health, education, and command over economic resources.140 The index assesses the 
gender-related inequalities of 148 countries, by accounting for inequality in favor of men 
and women equally.141  
 
3.3.2. The World Economic Forum  
The World Economic Forum (WEF) is a non-governmental international organization 
established in Switzerland in 1971, engaged in shaping global and regional agendas by 
promoting entrepreneurship in the global interest.142 Since 2006, through the Global 
Gender Gap Report series, the WEF has been quantifying the degree of gender-based 
disparities and tracking their progress over time. By providing a comprehensive 
framework for benchmarking global gender gaps, rather than levels, the index shows a 
strong correlation between a country’s gender gap and its national competitiveness, 
income and development, pointing out that a country’s contribution to closing gender 
gaps is not only a matter of human rights and equality, but also one of efficiency.143  
The Global Gender Gap Index (GGI) seeks to measure out the relative gaps between 
women and men, across a set of over 200 countries in four key areas: health and survival, 
educational attainment, economic participation and opportunity, and political 
empowerment. The countries are ranked according to gender equality, rather than 
women’s empowerment.144 The final scores for all the subindexes range between 1 
(equality) and 0 (inequality). 
The Global Competitiveness Report (GCR) is WEF’s overview of 144 economies’ 
performance measured by over 100 indicators of competitiveness and global risks. 
Competitiveness is defined as the set of institutions, policies and factors that determine 
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the level of productivity of a country.145 The level of productivity influences the 
countries’ growth rates, which, in turn, reflect the country’s level of prosperity. The 
various aspects of the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) address the existing 
institutions, infrastructure, macroeconomic environment, health and primary education, 
good market efficiency, labor market efficiency, financial market development, 
technological readiness, market size, and business sophistication and innovation.146 
 
3.4. Annual Progress Reports of the European Commission  
 
 The EU accession conditions set forth in 1993 with the adoption of the Copenhagen 
criteria provided the basis for a standardized evaluation of the prospective members’ 
progress on the adoption and implementation of the acquis. As the EU’s accession 
conditionality evolved from a political economy-oriented integration criteria 
characteristic of the early ECSC, toward a broader vision incorporating a pronounced 
concern for good human rights practices, a more articulated emphasis on the importance 
of democracy implementation has been accompanying its annual assessment of the 
candidate states’ progresses. The reports’ evaluations cover the strengths and weaknesses 
of the acquis adoption and implementation and offer recommendations for effectively 
addressing the problematic issues, acting as guidelines for democratic consolidation. The 
granting of the candidacy, beginning of the accession negotiations, as well as the opening 
and closing of new chapters are determined in large part by the Commission’s Reports. 
 Annual Reports on Turkey’s progress in complying with the accession 
conditionality have been issued since 1998, when it had first acknowledged its progress 
in preparing for membership and laid grounds for the first Accession Partnership 
Document of March 2001.147 One of the main themes that the EC’s discourse on Turkey 
consistently refers to is democracy and the country’s developments on transferring and 
implementing the acquis. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
TURKEY’S DEMOCRACY UNDER INTERNATIONAL INDICES  
 
 
Whereas a varying number of instruments and frameworks for measuring democracy can 
account for a diversity of approaches to assessing a country’s progression in time, 
Turkey’s presence in international indices and ratings provides a valuable resource for 
examining its democracy patterns over time. The data gathered from international 
agencies’ annual reports will thus be disseminated in the current chapter, with an 
emphasis on democracy, governance and human development – as the main components 
of the political dimension of the accession criteria. Although in various country evaluation 
reports, these spheres appear interconnected, without a clear-cut categorization, in this 
study, Turkey’s ratings and rankings will be divided according to the three major policy 
areas—democracy, governance, human development—and interpreted accordingly. 
 
4.1. Democracy  
 
4.1.1. Freedom in Turkey – Freedom House Index 
Figure 1 indicates Turkey’s freedom scores over the years, between 2005 and 2013. The 
left vertical axis indicates the ratings’ range, according to which, the lower the score is, 
the freer the country. Throughout this period, Turkey has maintained its ‘partly free’ 
status unchanged, yet the increased score of the recent years signaled a decrease in the 
overall freedoms and rights.  
 
 
Figure 1. Freedom in the World Index 
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The Freedom House report points out that one of the reasons for the declining trend line 
on fundamental freedoms has been the increasingly harsh government stance on public 
protests, as much as increasing pressure on private companies to conform to the party 
agenda.148  
Figure 2 shows Turkey’s political rights indicators’ fluctuations between 2005 and 2013. 
The subscores range from 1 to 60 (where 60 indicates the highest performance), and 
reflect the country’s developments in regards to the electoral process, political pluralism 
and participation, as well as the functioning of the government.  The latter is shown to 
have maintained its position, as FH notes that corruption still remains a problematic issue 
in Turkey.  
 
Figure 2. Freedom in the World Index Political Rights Subscores 
 
In regards to the electoral process, Turkey has made visible progress in 2011, at a time 
when the parliamentary elections of June were the first ones to allow for campaigning in 
Kurdish.149 The AKP managed to secure its victory by winning nearly 50% of the votes 
and 326 of 550 seats. The opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) and Nationalist 
Action Party (MHP) took 135 and 53 seats, respectively, and independents, mostly from 
the BDP, won the remaining 36 seats. 
The freedom of political pluralism participation is shown to have slightly decreased over 
time, as, although there is a competitive multiparty system in place, political parties can 
still be disbanded for endorsing policies that are not in agreement with constitutional 
parameters. 
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Figure 3 shows the Freedom Index’s subscores on civil liberties in Turkey between 2005 
and 2013. Most indicators are shown to have experienced a decline in 2012.  
Freedom of expression and belief has been steadily declining since 2005, experiencing a 
descending trend line.  
 
 
Figure 3. Freedom in the World Index Civil Liberties Subscores 
 
The four main legal sources concerning freedom of expression have been The 
Constitution, the Turkish Penal Code, the Press Law and the Anti-Terror Law. The Article 
28 of the Constitution guarantees the freedom of the press but likewise restricts it, as 
publications endangering the integrity or security of the state, concerning state secrets or 
publications with the intention to encourage rebellion or other offenses are prohibited.150 
Such legal provisions allowed the government increased legal grounds to restrict freedom 
of expression and belief and, as the EU’s annual reports emphasized, Turkey is still 
expected to increase the reform pace so as to guarantee the respect for civil liberties as 
well. 
The personal autonomy and individual rights, as well as the associational and 
organizational rights have also been declining since 2012, a decline that has been 
experienced more recently through the consistent, forceful police interfering with public 
gatherings, on grounds of maintaining order and alleging the presence of violent 
hooligans and radical groups among the protesters. The government’s response to the 
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Gezi protests of 2013 has been criticized in the FH’s report, as well as the legal restrictions 
imposed on labor union’s activities,151 
Regarding the strengthening of rule of law, FH notes that, although certain legal steps 
have been formally taken in 2012 so as to guarantee an independent judiciary, in practice, 
the government can still influence judges through appointments, promotions, and 
financing.152 Moreover, despite certain laws had been enacted to prevent torture, reports 
of mistreatment are still continuing.  
The declines in Turkey’s civil freedoms, as well as the weak performance in guaranteeing 
equal political freedoms, as reflected by the Freedom in the World Index, are consistent 
with the EU’s skepticism of Turkey’s true commitment to fulfill the accession 
conditionality, noting that ‘the vulnerable status of freedom of expression pointed to ‘an 
excessively narrow interpretation of the Constitution and other legal provisions’.153  
 
4.1.2. The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) Democracy Index 
Figure 4 shows Turkey’s scores under the EIU Democracy index, between 2006 and 2012, 
in comparison with the average scores per geographical region. The left vertical axis 
indicates the score range, between 0 and 10 (10 being the highest score). Turkey’s scores 
showed little fluctuation (the lowest—5.69, the highest—5.73) and were closer to the 
Easter Europe’s average, rather than to Western Europe or the Middle East. 
Turkey’s rank slightly fluctuated from 87/165 in 2008, to 89 in 2010, and 88 in 
2012, while it maintained its status as a hybrid democratic regime. A full democracy is 
represented by a score between 8.0 and 10, a flawed democracy—6 to 7.9, a hybrid 
regime—4.0 to 5.9, and an authoritarian regime—0 to 3.9.  
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Figure 4. EIU Democracy Index 
 
According to the EIU Democracy Index’s methodology, even though half of the world’s 
countries are considered to be democracies, the number of ‘full democracies’ is relatively 
low, and they are mostly OECD countries. Almost twice as many are rated as ‘flawed 
democracies’, while, out of the remaining 85 states, 55 are authoritarian and 30 are 
considered to be ‘hybrid regimes’. The EIU Index shows that Turkey’s democratization 
process has not seen any major improvements between 2006 and 2012. 
 
4.1.3. Press Freedom Ranking – Freedom House 
Figure 5 shows Turkey’s scores on Press Freedom, according to data from Freedom 
House between 2005 and 2014. The left vertical axis indicates the score range, between 
0 and 100 (0 being the best, and 100—the worst). Whereas between 2005 and 2010, the 
little-fluctuating press freedom score indicated a certain constancy, after 2010, Turkey’s 
press freedom path appears to be abruptly declining, especially after 2013. FH’s latest 
freedom of the media assessment qualify Turkey as ‘not free’ – a unique status change in 
the past decade. Turkey’s legal environment score, 23, is also low (30 is the worst), 
political environment scores 26 out of 40 (40 being the worst), and the economic 
environment receives 13 points out of 30 (30 being the worst). Turkey has experienced a 
sharp decline in its press freedom scores, having had a fluctuation of 11 points over the 
course of 4 years (see Annex 1). 
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Figure 5. FH Press Freedom Ranking 
 
FH explains the status change by referring to the sharp deterioration of the press freedom 
environment following the 2013 protests and the government’s formal and informal 
pressures on media owners.154 The report points out that the aggressive use of the 
antiterrorism law, and the long periods of pretrial detention signaled that the constitutional 
guarantees of press freedom and freedom of expression are not implemented in practice. 
Notably, the 2011 amendment to the press law (previously improved under EU 
conditionality) further restricted the media by allowing for any broadcasting to be 
interrupted should a threat to national security emerge.155 
According to the Freedom House 2013 Corruption Report, the Turkish government’s 
greatest leverage over the media, is economic, as the prime minister’s office controls the 
allocation of billions of dollars in privatized assets, housing contracts, and a public 
procurement process that allows rewarding favored companies, and punishing the media 
outlets critical of the government.156 
The antiterrorism law has also been criticized by the EU in its 2014 progress report, 
stating that certain Turkish legal provisions and their subjective interpretation allow for 
severe restrictions on the freedom of expression and freedom of expression, 
notwithstanding the restrictions brought forth by the amended Internet Law and the 
subsequent bans, a development which is entirely against EU’s core principles to which 
Turkey has been officially adhering.157 
                                                          
154 FH, 2014, Press Freedom Report 
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4.1.4. The Press Freedom Index - Reporters Without Borders 
Figure 6 shows Turkey’s ranking according to the Press Freedom Index published by 
Reporters Without Borders. The ranking is classifies countries according to the press 
freedom score achieved in a particular year, ranging from 0 (free) to 100 (not free). 
Turkey’s ranking shows an abrupt decline after 2008, moving from the 102nd position to 
the 154th.  
 
 
Figure 6. Reporters Without Borders, Press Freedom Index 
 
In the detailed report, RSF concluded that, despite its regional aspirations, Turkey 
registered no improvement whatsoever and continues to be one of the world’s biggest 
prisons for journalists.158 The events related to the protests from 2013 highlighted the 
repressive methods used by the security forces, the increase in media’s self-censorship 
and the dangers of the Prime Minister’s polarizing discourse. 
The report also noted that, despite a few limited reforms, judicial practices continue to be 
repressive and the number of detained journalists is still at a level that is unprecedented 
since the end of the military regime. Despite increasing international criticism of the use 
of provisional detention, journalists often spend months if not years in prison before being 
tried. The number of imprisoned journalists at the end of 2013 arguably made Turkey one 
of the world’s biggest prisons for media personnel.159  
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RSF’s assessment of the freedoms of expression and freedom of the media in Turkey 
mirrors the FH evaluation, as well as the EU’s voiced concern over Turkey’s democratic 
consolidation and compatibility with European Union’s core values.160  
 
 
4.2. Governance  
 
4.2.1. Rule of Law Index - The World Justice Project 
  
Figure 7 shows Turkey’s ratings by the Rule of Law Index of the World Justice Project, 
between 2010 and 2014. The axis values are 1 for the most rule of law and 0 for the least 
rule of law. Turkey’s rule of law progress has been rather constant, with little fluctuations.  
 
 
Figure 7. WJP Rule of Law Index 
 
The relatively unchanged position  of the eight Rule of Law indicators—constraints on 
government powers, absence of corruption, open government, fundamental rights, order 
and security, regulatory enforcement, civil justice, and criminal justice—are showing a 
lack of any substantial changes, despite EU’s concerns and recommendations on ensuring 
the separation of powers and adequate checks and balances guaranteeing rule of law.161 
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4.2.2. Worldwide Governance Indicators  
 
Rule of Law  
Figure 8 shows Turkey’s ranking according to the World Bank’s Rule of Law indicators 
between 2004 and 2013. The vertical axis indicates the percentile rank, and the inner blue 
line shows Turkey’s rank fluctuations, whereas the orange lines delineate the margins of 
error.  
 
 
Figure 8. World Bank – Turkey’s Rule of Law 
 
The WGI Rule of Law ranking is consistent with the WJP Rule of Law index in outlining 
Turkey’s international position, which, aside from a minor increase in 2010 and a slight 
decrease in 2013, has been predominantly constant throughout the decade.  
 
Control of Corruption 
Figure 9 shows Turkey’s ranking reflected by the Control of Corruption Index between 
2004—2013.  The percentile ranks are plotted on the horizontal axis, while their estimates 
of governance and associated confidence intervals on the vertical axis. The data show that 
Turkey’s has had an ascending progress between 2004 and 2008, which has stalled after 
2009, maintaining its position at 61/100.  
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Figure 9. World Bank – Corruption Perception Index 
 
Corruption has been a significant problem in Turkey over the years. Despite limited 
positive developments reflecting modest rank changes, other indicators suggest that the 
country has yet to overcome this obstacle. The EU has repeatedly signaled the need for 
transparency regarding political parties’ funding and criticized the lack of effective legal 
solutions for enforcing anti-corruption policies. In its 2014 Progress Report, the European 
Commission noted that no concrete steps were taken to implement the 2010-2014 national 
anti-corruption policy and that the action plan continued without any information given 
to parliament or civil society on the resulting impact.162 
 
4.2.3. Corruption Perception Index - Transparency International  
 
Figure 10 reveals Turkey’s score under Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perception Index (CPI), ranging from 2005 to 2014. The CPI score indicates the perceived 
level of public sector corruption on a scale of 0 - 100, where 0 means that the country is 
perceived as highly corrupt and 100 means it is perceived as very clean. Turkey’s CPI 
score has been on an ascending path between 2005—2008 and 2011—2013. The 
corruption perception has been declining in 2014, as a result of the high-profile corruption 
allegations of 2013.163  
 
                                                          
162 Ibid. p 22 
163 See http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303949504579263601010522432 
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Figure 10. Transparency International – CPI Turkey 
 
The strong immunity regulations for high-ranking public officials have also been brought 
up by the EU, as obstacles in addressing corruption in a transparent way as part of 
strengthening the rule of law. According to the immunity law, corruption cases involving 
members of the parliament, ministers, the Prime Minister, or the President cannot not 
pursued unless the Prime Minister decides so.164 Permission is also required from the 
superiors of public officials in order to open investigations against them.165 As the FH 
2008 Report pointed out, the main argument against lifting the immunity of MPs has been 
that they would be constantly facing corruption allegations from the opposition, and this 
would hinder carrying out their professional duties.  
According to Transparency International’s 2013 Report, the sector most affected by 
corruption in Turkey are public administration, education, and the private sector, closely 
followed by political parties and the military.166 These aspects are also emphasized by the 
EU in its recommendations for Turkey regarding its compliance with the accession 
conditionality.  
 
4.2.4. GRECO Evaluations  
As of 2014, GRECO has launched four evaluation rounds regarding certain dispositions 
of the Twenty Guiding Principles (and associated provisions of the Criminal Law 
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Convention). The Fourth Evaluation Round, started in January 2012, focuses on the 
prevention of corruption through examining the Members of Parliament, Judges and 
Prosecutors’ ethical principles and rules of conduct, conflict of interest, prohibition or 
restriction of certain activities, declaration of assets, income, liabilities and interests, 
enforcement of the rules regarding conflicts of interest, and awareness.167   
The latest report on Turkey has been released in the third evaluation round. Whereas upon 
GRECO’s previous recommendations expressed in the Compliance Report of 2012 
Turkey has adopted a new legal framework for the criminalization of corruption offences 
by expanding the definition of bribery and corrupt behavior and thus bringing new legal 
provisions into practice, Turkey’s legal framework has yet to effectively address the 
private sector bribery, the special defense and the jurisdictional rule.168  
In regards to party funding transparency—as one of the key points of the third evaluation 
report—Turkey has also not made any substantial progress, as its efforts to carry forth 
new regulations for implementing transparency have mostly resumed to a “Draft Bill on 
the Amendment of Certain Laws for the Purpose of Ensuring Transparency in the 
Financing of Elections” prepared by the Ministry of Justice, and which has not been 
submitted in the Parliament nor received Governmental approval.169 Having taken into 
account the fact that Turkey has not acted upon any of the nine recommendations set forth 
in the Compliance Report of 2012, and according to GRECO’s rules of procedure,170 the 
Second Compliance Report of March 2014 found Turkey’s progress as “globally 
unsatisfactory”.  
 
4.3. Human Development 
 
4.3.1. Human Development Index (HDI) 
Figure 11 shows the HDI values between 2005 and 2013 for Turkey and the World.  The 
HDI classifications are based on HDI fixed cut-off points, which are less than 0.550 for 
low human development, 0.550–0.699 for medium human development, 0.700–0.799 for 
high human development and 0.800 or greater for very high human development. 
 
                                                          
167 http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/intro_en.asp 
168 GRECO, 2013, Second Compliance Report on Turkey 
169 Ibid. Art. 101 
170 GRECO, 2013, Rules of Procedure, Rule 31, Paragraph 8.3 
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Figure 11. Human Development Index 2005—2013 
 
Turkey’s HDI values have been steadily increasing between 2005 and 2011, and remained 
constant for the following two years. The score on 2013 is 0.759— which is representative 
for the high human development category—positioning the country on the 69th rank out 
of 187 countries and territories. 
Table 2 shows Turkey’s progress regarding the HDI indicators between 2000 and 2013. 
Turkey’s life expectancy at birth increased by 5.3 years, the mean years of schooling 
increased by 2.1 years and the expected years of schooling increased by 2.3 years. 
Turkey’s GNI per capita also increased significantly between 2000 and 2013. 
 
Table 2. Turkey’s HDI trends, 2000—2013 (Source: HDR 2014)  
                              Life expectancy  
                                      at birth  
Expected years 
of schooling  
Mean years of 
schooling  
GNI per capita 
(2011 PPP$)  
HDI value  
2000  70.0  11.1  5.5  12,890  0.653  
2005  72.5  11.9  6.0  15,060  0.687  
2010  74.3  13.9  7.2  16,587  0.738  
2011  74.6  14.4  7.4  17,814  0.752  
2012  74.9  14.4  7.6  18,011  0.756  
2013  75.3  14.4  7.6  18,391  0.759  
 
 
4.3.2. Gender Inequality Index (GII)  
Turkey’s 2013 ranking according to its GII score (0.360) is 69 out of 149 countries. 
Regarding women’s participation in politics, the GII reports that, as of 2013, 14.2 percent 
of the parliamentary seats were held by women. Additionally, 39.0 percent of adult 
women have reached at least a secondary level of education whereas 60.0 percent of male 
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adults have succeeded as such. Female participation in the labor market is 29.4 percent 
compared to 70.8 for men.171 These high differences between gender participation in 
education, politics and economy fall below the high HDI countries.172 
The EU 2014 progress report also notes that Turkey’s gender disparity remains 
considerable in some regions, despite an overall decrease—of 1.2 percent. At the same 
time, Turkey did not make any recent progress on adopting measures to promote gender 
equality, although they have been pending since the relevant 2010 constitutional 
amendments had been adopted.173 
 
4.3.3. Gender Gap Index - The World Economic Forum 
Figure 12 shows Turkey’s Gender Gap Index (GGI) ratings between 2006 and 2013 
according to economic participation, educational attainment, health and survival, and 
political empowerment subindexes. For all indicators, except the two health indicators 
(for which it is 1.06), the equality benchmark is considered to be 1, thus meaning equal 
numbers of women and men.  
 
Figure 12. Turkey’s GGI ratings, 2006—2013  
 
Turkey’s highest subindex score is for the health and survival indicator, ranging from 
0.969 in 2006 to 0.976 in 2013. This means that the sex ratio at birth and life expectancy 
is closest to equal between women and men. The educational attainment score is also 
high, ascending from 0.854 in 2007 to 0.943 in 2013, indicating that the equal access to 
education has also been increasing. The economic participation indicator has not shown 
any significant change, remaining situated below the 0.5 benchmark. As for the political 
empowerment gap, Turkey’s scores are very close to the inequality benchmark, with the 
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highest score achieved in 2001, of 0.097, and on the 103rd position out of 136. This reflects 
a great disparity between women and men at the highest level of political decision-making 
(minister-level positions and parliamentary positions). This finding is also consistent with 
the EU’s 2014 progress report which noted that no significant change in the gender 
balance in the field, with women making up approximately a quarter of the judiciary and 
being particularly underrepresented in prosecutorial and managerial positions.174 
As of 2013, out of the 136 countries evaluated by the Report, over 96% of the gap in 
health outcomes has been closed, 93% of the gap in educational attainment, 60% of the 
gap in economic participation and 21% of the gap in political empowerment. The GGI 
rankings by region place Turkey at the bottom position in Europe, with an overall score 
of 0.6081, compared to Iceland’s, 0.8731.175 
 
4.3.4. Global Competitiveness Index – The World Economic Forum 
Figure 13 shows Turkey’s Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) scores and ranking, 
between 2006 and 2014. The left vertical axis shows the ranking spectrum, from 0 to 148, 
and the right vertical axis measures the GCI numeric values, ranging from 1 to 7 (1 being 
the lowest GCI, 7—the highest). The global ranking has increased from 63 in 2009, to 45 
in 2014. The GCI score has remained steady between 2012—2014, in an overall pattern 
of increase. Turkey’s 2013—2014 weighted average score on transparency of 
government policymaking is above average, as 4.4 out of 7 (7 is the highest), ranking 42 
out of 144.176 In regards to the ease of doing business, the most problematic factors 
outlined by the GCI report are the inefficient government bureaucracy, policy instability, 
the inadequately educated workforce, followed by tax rates.177 
 
                                                          
174 Ibid p 22 
175 WEF, Gender Gap Report, 2013 
176 WEF, Gender Gap Report, 2014, p 368 
177 Ibid. 
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Figure 13. Turkey’s GCI Ratings, 2006—2014 
 
The 2014 EU progress report also brought up Turkey’s shortcomings in terms of 
implementing a comprehensive strategic framework for public administration reform.178 
While limited progress with the reform implementation was noted, the report readdressed 
the importance of increasing transparency and accountability by further strengthening 
policy development and coordination.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
Although Turkey’s identification with democracy dates back to the earliest days of the 
Republic, the actual process of democratic consolidation has been less articulate, being 
marked by cyclical ups and downs patterns, reflecting a series of complex domestic 
dynamics, faced with the shifting realities of its geopolitical challenges. Whereas 
Turkey’s Kemalist ruling elite envisioned modernization as the adoption of European 
norms, the reforms that came through had been imposed by a top-down approach, ‘for the 
people, despite the people’. Although Turkey’s Europeanness has been actively debated, 
in the context of applying for EU membership—for most of its Republican days—Turkey 
has seen itself as a bridge between the East and the West, notwithstanding its belonging 
in Europe. Turkey’s first official ties with the EU took place in 1963, by signing the 
Ankara Agreement. 36 years later, at the Helsinki summit of December 1999 the 
European Council decided to include Turkey in the Union’s enlargement process.  
The post-Helsinki era brought a multitude of reforms and legislative changes, grounded 
in the commitment to comply with the EU conditionality, as means of progressing toward 
full membership. The conservative AKP, which came to power in 2002, undertook a 
series of reforms aimed at addressing democracy issues, all the while openly promoting 
EU integration. The commitment to implement the reforms has been met positively, and 
the EU decided to grant Turkey the official candidate status in 2005. After the 
negotiations started, the reform pace began to slow down. Since opening new negotiation 
chapters required the EU member states’ approval, Cyprus’ entering the EU in 2004 
further complicated Turkey’s bid for membership, as the decades-old conflict over 
recognizing the Republic of Cyprus resurfaced. In 2005, before the official start of the 
accession negotiations, Turkey had signed the Additional Protocol regarding the adoption 
of the Ankara Agreement, which was to include Cyprus as well, among other new 
member states in the Customs Union. Notwithstanding Cyprus’ new EU membership, 
Turkey maintained its decision to not recognize the state and, consequently, declined to 
open its ports and airports to Cypriot ships and planes. Despite pressures from members 
of all political groups in the European Parliament, Turkey has not fulfilled its full non-
discriminatory implementation of the Additional Protocol to the Association Agreement, 
which contributed to a halt in opening new negotiation chapters.  
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The EU’s demand for solving the Cyprus conflict as a prerequisite for opening new 
strategic negotiation chapters remained unchanged, and had also been read as a sign of 
decreased commitment for considering Turkey as a true potential member state. 
Consequently, this lack of credibility arguably contributed to Turkey’s reduced eagerness 
to implement new democratic reforms.  
As of 2014, the Cyprus issue still halts the opening of new chapters and the overall 
negotiations progress, and the entire post—2005 period witnessed a decreased 
commitment in fulfilling the EU conditionality by strengthening democracy and the rule 
of law. 
The first part of the thesis introduced the EU, its core values and their transfer mechanism 
toward non-member states by means of conditionality and external governance. The 
second chapter outlined Turkey’s history of democratic rule, as well as its quest for 
modernization through adjoining European political organizations, and, lastly, examined 
the reforms undertaken in line with EU conditionality. The third chapter introduced the 
international indices for measuring democracy indicators around the world, and their 
methodology.  
The fourth chapter examined Turkey’s rankings and scores under international indices. In 
all cases, the index reports had been consistent with the EU’s annual progress evaluation, 
reflecting weak, almost inexistent progresses. In terms of democracy indicators, Turkey’s 
worst decline has been registered regarding the freedom of expression and belief, freedom 
of association and freedom of the press. For most cases, these developments had been 
referred to as having been exacerbated by the 2013 Gezi events when the police forcefully 
intervened and prevented the citizens from exercising their freedom of assembly. The 
increased media censorship had also been reflected in the press freedom index, along with 
the strong government pressures and control over television channels’ broadcasting 
rights. For the first time in a decade, the Freedom House changed Turkey’s Press Freedom 
status from ‘partly-free’ to ‘not-free’, while strongly criticizing the government’s 
involvement in the media and the Press Law, which allows for certain restrictions of the 
press’ freedom and long periods of detention prior to arrest. The Reporters Without 
Borders’ report also resonates with Freedom House’s assessment of Turkey’s press 
freedom regression, condemning the journalists’ imprisonments, as much as the increased 
censorship within the media.  
The governance indicators showed no progress on rule of law, which appears to have 
remained under the same values it had since 2005. The control of corruption indicators 
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also fail to show any substantial progress in the fight against corruption. The GRECO 
report concluded that Turkey has not acted upon any of the nine recommendations set 
forth in 2012 and declared it “globally unsatisfactory”. In spite of a number of 
democratization reforms adopted through constitutional amendments and harmonization 
packages, corruption remains a problematic area in which the EU anchor did not 
incentivize a systemic reform. 
The human development indicators show moderate progress in terms of life expectancy 
and equal access to education. As for the gender gap index, Turkey still has a high gap 
between women and men’s political participation, and the score has changed negligibly 
since 2006. In terms of human rights abuses, Turkey has made progress in recent years, 
by providing training for judges, prosecutors and police on human rights issues and 
through the establishment of rights-monitoring boards and of a Parliamentary Human 
Rights Investigation Committee. However, Human Rights organizations continue to point 
out violations and human rights defenders can still face prosecution. 
Overall, the international indices rankings reflect a decline in civil liberties indicators and 
a stagnation in strengthening the rule of law. Whereas the gender inequality indicators 
seem to indicate an improvement, genuine respect for human rights has yet to be 
transferred into practice.  
Whereas Turkey’s positioning under international indices over the past decade indicate a 
slight decline in individual freedoms and an overall stagnation in rule of law, it can be 
argued that there has been little to no advance of democracy, nor a firm consolidation of 
the adopted constitutional reforms by transferring them into practice. This can be 
accounted for by considering both domestic and external factors, namely a rising wave of 
Euroskepticism, decreased attractiveness of EU membership from both sides, as well as 
the emergence of new challenges and opportunities for the country’s foreign policy. The 
EU anchor has not significantly fostered democratic consolidation, especially in the 
recent years, when sharp declines in fundamental freedoms have occurred, despite the 
country’s de facto adherence to EU values and institutional framework. As of 2014, 
Turkey’s accession progress is still stalling, with only 14 negotiation chapters opened179 
and 17 of the remaining chapters blocked by member states’ veto and by the EC’s decision 
                                                          
179 These chapters are: 4- Free Movement of Capital; 6- Company Law; 7- Intellectual Property Law; 10- 
Information Society and Media; 12- Food Safety, Veterinary and Phytosanitary; 16- Taxation; 18- 
Statistics; 20- Enterprise and Industrial Policy; 21- Trans-European Networks; 25- Science and Research 
(provisionally closed); 27- Environment; 28- Consumer and Health protection; 32- Financial Control 
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originated in Turkey’s non-implementation of the Additional Protocol to the Ankara 
Agreement in regards to the Cypriot state. Developments such as the Cyprus conflict, the 
decrease in fundamental freedoms, the rising polarization, as well as the declining 
political and public support for membership in both the EU and Turkey are aspects that 
undoubtedly influenced the pace of political reforms. Nevertheless, Turkey may still 
benefit from opening key chapters such as 23 (on Judiciary and Fundamental Rights) and 
24 (on Justice, Freedom and Society), a process that would re-address democracy 
consolidation. As the latest EU progress report pointed out, “the constitutional reform 
process would constitute the most credible avenue for advancing further democratization 
of Turkey, providing for the separation of powers and adequate checks and balances 
guaranteeing freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, 
including the rights of people belonging to minorities.”180 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
180 European Commission Report, Turkey, 2014, p 14 
 56 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Agreement Establishing an Association Between the European Economic Community  
and Turkey, 1963, Ankara 
 
Ahmad, F. (1993). The Making of Modern Turkey. New York: Routledge 
 
Aknur. M. (2012). Democratic Consolidation in Turkey: State, Political Parties, Civil  
Society, Civil-Military Relations, Socio-Economic Development, EU, Rise of  
Political Islam and Separatist Kurdish Nationalism. Boca Raton, Florida: 
Universal-Publishers 
 
Avcı G. Çarkoğlu A. ed. (2013) Turkey and the EU: Accession and Reform. South  
European Society and Politics, 16:2, 3. Taylor & Francis. London, New York: 
Routledge 
 
Aydın-Düzgit, Ş. (2012). Constructions of European Identity. Debates and Discourses  
on Turkey and the EU. Identities and Modernities in Europe. Palgrave Macmillan 
 
Aydın-Düzgit, Ş. et al. (2013). Global Turkey in Europe. Political, Economic, and  
Foreign Policy Dimensions of Turkey’s Relationship with the EU. IAI Research 
Papers. Edizioni Nuova Cultura: Roma 
 
Camyar, I., Tagma, H. M.  (2010). Why Does Turkey Seek European Union  
Membership? A Historical Institutional Approach. Turkish Studies, 11:3, 371-
386 
 
Characteristics of the Treaty on European Union, (2012), retrieved from  
http://www.cvce.eu/obj/characteristics_of_the_treaty_on_european_union-en-
beec7a53-4023-412d-a1ab-2c31b6a3c39d.html on 11.12.2014 on 01.12.2014 
 
Commission Staff Working Document, Turkey 2006 Progress Report, Brussels 
 
Commission Staff Working Document, Turkey 2013 Progress Report, Brussels 
 
Commission Staff Working Document, Turkey 2014 Progress Report, Brussels 
 
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 2012 
 
Council of the European Union, Presidency Conclusions, Copenhagen, European  
Council, 2004 
 
Cuma, Ç. (2011). Elimination or Integration of Pro‐Kurdish Politics: Limits of the  
AKP's Democratic Initiative. Turkish Studies, 12:1, 15-26 
 
Davies, M. (2013). The legacy of Atatürk: the limits of conditionality in Turkish  
European Union membership negotiations. Australian Journal of International 
Affairs, 67:4, 511-525 
 
Economist Intelligence Unit, Democracy Index, 2006 
 57 
 
 
Economist Intelligence Unit, Democracy Index, 2008 
 
Economist Intelligence Unit, Democracy Index, 2012 
 
Economist Intelligence Unit, Democracy Index. 2010 
 
Economist Intelligence Unit, The World in 2007 
 
Epstein, R.A. Sedelmeier, U. (2008). Beyond Conditionality: International Institutions  
in Post-Communist Europe after Enlargement. Journal of European Public 
Policy 15(6): 795–805 
 
Eralp, A. (2009). Temporality, Cyprus Problem and Turkey- EU Relations. Center for  
Economic and Foreign Policy Studies Discussion Series  
 
European Commission. Turkey 2013 Progress Report. Brussels, Belgium: European  
Commission, 2013 
 
European Commission. Turkey 2014 Progress Report. Brussels, Belgium: European  
Commission, 2014 
 
European Economic Community Treaty, Official Journal, 25.3.1957, retrieved from  
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/treaties_eec_
en.htm  on 01.12.2014  
 
Freedom House Report on Freedom of Press in Turkey, 2005 
 
Freedom House Report on Freedom of Press in Turkey, 2006 
 
Freedom House Report on Freedom of Press in Turkey, 2007 
 
Freedom House Report on Freedom of Press in Turkey, 2008 
 
Freedom House Report on Freedom of Press in Turkey, 2009 
 
Freedom House Report on Freedom of Press in Turkey, 2010 
 
Freedom House Report on Freedom of Press in Turkey, 2011 
 
Freedom House Report on Freedom of Press in Turkey, 2012 
 
Freedom House Report on Freedom of Press in Turkey, 2013 
 
Freedom House Report on Freedom of Press in Turkey, 2014 
 
Freedom House, 60 Years Report, 2010 
 
Freedom House, Freedom in the World, Methodology, 2014 
 
 58 
 
Freyburg, T., Lavenex, S., Schimmelfennig, F., Skripka, T., Wetzel, A. (2009). EU  
Promotion of Democratic Governance in the Neighbourhood, Journal of 
European Public Policy 16(6): 916–34 
 
GRECO RC III. (2013). 27E. Second Compliance Report on Turkey. Incriminations  
(ETS 173 and 191, GP 2). Third Evaluations Round, Strasbourg 
 
GRECO, (2011). Rules of Procedure, adopted in 1999. Strasbourg 
 
Jenkins, G. (2001). Context and Circumstance: The Turkish Military and Politics. New  
York: Oxford University Press Inc. 
 
Hawthorne, O. E., (2013). Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index:  
‘best flawed’ measure on Corruption?  Paper submitted to the 3rd Global 
Conference on Transparency Research, HEC Paris 
 
Human Development Report, 2005 
 
Human Development Report, 2006 
 
Human Development Report, 2007-2008 
 
Human Development Report, 2009 
 
Human Development Report, 2010 
 
Human Development Report, 2011 
 
Human Development Report, 2012 
 
Human Development Report, 2013 
 
Human Development Report, 2014 
 
Human Development Report, 2014, Turkey – Explanatory Notes 
 
Jacoby, T. (2010). Identity Politics, Turkey and the European Union. Mediterranean  
Politics, 15:1, 109-119 
 
Johansson-Nogués, E., Jonasson A., K. (2011). Turkey, Its Changing National Identity  
and EU Accession: Explaining the Ups and Downs in the Turkish  
Democratization Reforms. Journal of Contemporary European Studies, 19:0 
 
JRC Scientific and Policy Reports, (2012). Corruption Perception Index 2012.  
Statistical Assessment, European Commission, Joint Research Centre  
Kalaycıoğlu, E. (2005). Turkish Dynamics: Bridge across Troubled Lands, Palgrave  
MacMillan 
 
Keyman, E. F., Koyuncu, B. (2005). Globalization, Alternative Modernities and the  
 59 
 
Political Economy of Turkey. Review of International Political Economy, 12, 
105-128 
 
Keyman, E. F., Öniş Z. (2007). Turkish Politics in a changing world: global dynamics  
and domestic transformations. Istanbul Bilgi University Press  
 
Kubicek, P. (2011). Political Conditionality and European Union’s cultivation of  
democracy in Turkey. Democratization, 18.4; 910-931 
 
Laffan, B. (2004). The European Union and its Institutions as Identity Bridgers" in  
Risse, Thomas et al. (edited). Transnational Identities: becoming European in 
the EU. Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Oxford, UK 
 
Lavenex, S. (2004). EU external Governance in “Wider Europe”’, Journal of European  
Public Policy 11(4): 680–700 
 
Lowrie, T., Diezmann, C. M. (2009). National numeracy tests: A graphic tells a  
thousand words. Australian Journal of Education, 53, 141-158 
 
Lynggaard, K. (2011). Domestic Change in the Face of European Integration and  
Globalization: Methodological Pitfalls and Pathways. Comparative European 
Politics 9(1): 18–37 
Manners, I. (2013). European Communion: Political Theory of European Union,  
Journal of European Public Policy, 20:4, 473-494 
 
Morelli, L. (2013). European Union Enlargement: A Status Report on Turkey’s  
Accession Negotiations. Congressional Research Service 
 
Müftüler-Baç, M. (2005). Turkey's Political Reforms and the Impact of the European  
Union. South European Society and Politics, 10:1, 17-31 
 
Müftüler-Bac, M. (2008). Turkey’s Accession to the European Union: The Impact of  
the EU’s Internal Dynamics. International Studies Perspective. 9: 201- 219 
 
NATO. (2009). The Alliance's New Strategic Concept, retrieved from  
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_23847.htm?selectedLocale=ru  
 
Official Journal of the European Union. No C 306. (2007). Treaty of Lisbon amending  
the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European 
Community 
 
Öniş, Z. Şenses, F. (2007). Global Dynamics, Domestic Coalitions and a Reactive State:  
Major Policy Shifts in Post-War Turkish Economic Development, METU 
Studies in Development, Vol. 34 No. 2, 251-286 
 
Öniş, Z. (2008). Turkey–EU Relations: Beyond the Current Stalemate. Insight Turkey  
10, no. 4: 35–50 
Özbudun, E. (2007). Democratization Reforms in Turkey, 1993–2004. Turkish Studies  
8, no. 2; 179–96 
 60 
 
 
Peters, G. (2000). ‘Governance and comparative politics’, in J. Pierre (ed.), Debating  
Governance, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 36–53 
Pridham, G. (2000). EU Accession and Domestic Politics: Policy Consensus and  
Interactive Dynamics in Central and Eastern Europe 
 
Pridham, G. (2007). Change and Continuity in the European Union’s Political  
Conditionality: Aims, Approach, and Priorities. Democratization 14, no. 3: 446–
471 
 
Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession, 2004, Commission of the  
European Union, Brussels 
 
Reporters Without Borders, Methodology, 2014 
 
Reporters Without Borders, Worldwide Press Freedom Index, 2005 
 
Reporters Without Borders, Worldwide Press Freedom Index, 2006 
 
Reporters Without Borders, Worldwide Press Freedom Index, 2007 
 
Reporters Without Borders, Worldwide Press Freedom Index, 2008 
 
Reporters Without Borders, Worldwide Press Freedom Index, 2009 
 
Reporters Without Borders, Worldwide Press Freedom Index, 2010 
 
Reporters Without Borders, Worldwide Press Freedom Index, 2011—2012 
 
Reporters Without Borders, Worldwide Press Freedom Index, 2013 
 
Risse, T. (2004). Social Constructivism and European Union integration. Wiener, A.,  
Diez, T.(eds.), European Integration Theory. Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press 
 
Rose, R. (2008). Evaluating Democratic Governance: A Bottom-up Approach to  
European Union Enlargement. Democratization, 15:2, 251-271 
 
Saatçioğlu, B. (2014). AKP's ‘Europeanization’ in Civilianization, Rule of Law and  
Fundamental Freedoms: The Primacy of Domestic Politics. Journal of Balkan 
and Near Eastern Studies, 16:1, 86-101 
 
Schimmelfennig, F. (2008). EU Political Accession Conditionality After the 2004  
Enlargement: Consistency and Effectiveness, Journal of European Public 
Policy. 15.6: 918- 937 
 
Schimmelfenning, F., Lavenex, S. (2011). EU Democracy Promotion in the in the 
 
Neighborhood: from Leverage to Governance?” Democratization. 18.4.(2011): 
885-909. 
 61 
 
Schimmelfenning, F., Sedelmeier, U. (2004). Governance by Conditionality: EU rule 
Transfer to the Candidate Countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Journal of 
European Public Policy, 15:6, 918-937 
Transparency International, 2013, Turkey – Corruption Report 
 
Treaty constituting the European Coal and Steal Community 
 
Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community. (2010). European Union, 
 
Treaty Establishing the European Union 
 
Treaty on European Union, 11.09.2012, Centre Virtuel de la Connaissance sur l'Europe  
(CVCE) 
 
Treaty on European Union, 29.07.1992, Official Journal of the European Commission.  
rretrieved from  
http://www.cvce.eu/obj/characteristics_of_the_treaty_on_european_union-en-
beec7a53-4023-412d-a1ab-2c31b6a3c39d.html, on 01.12.2014 
 
Turkey 2005 Progress Report, European Commission, Brussels 
 
Turkey’s Progress Toward Accession. Brussels, Belgium: European Commission, 2000 
 
Turkey's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ankara 2007, "Political Reforms in Turkey" 
 
Usul, A.R. (2014). Is There Any Hope on the Revival of EU–Turkey Relations in the  
New Era? Turkish Studies, 15:2, 283-302 
 
Wigley, S. (2009). Parliamentary Immunity in Democratizing Countries: The Case of  
Turkey. Human Rights Quarterly, 31:567–591 
 
World Bank, Country Data Report on Turkey, 1980—2013 
  
World Bank, Turkey at a Glance, 2014 
 
World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Report, 2006—2007 
 
World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Report, 2008—2009 
 
World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Report, 2009—2010 
 
World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Report, 2012—2013 
 
World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Report, 2014—2015 
  
World Economic Forum, Global Gender Gap Report, 2006 
 
World Economic Forum, Global Gender Gap Report, 2007 
 
World Economic Forum, Global Gender Gap Report, 2008 
 62 
 
 
World Economic Forum, Global Gender Gap Report, 2009 
 
World Economic Forum, Global Gender Gap Report, 2010 
 
World Economic Forum, Global Gender Gap Report, 2011 
 
World Economic Forum, Global Gender Gap Report, 2012 
 
World Economic Forum, Global Gender Gap Report, 2013 
 
World Justice Project, Methodology, 2014 
 
World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index, 2010 
 
World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index, 2011 
 
World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index, 2012-2013 
 
World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index, 2014 
 
Yildiz, N. (2011). The Relation Between Socioeconomic Development and   
Democratization in Contemporary Turkey. Turkish Studies Vol. 12, No. 1, 129–
148 
 
Yılmaz, G., Soyaltın, D. (2014). Zooming into the ‘Domestic’ in Europeanization:  
Promotion of Fight against Corruption and Minority Rights in Turkey, Journal 
of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, 16:1, 11-29 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 63 
 
ANNEXES 
 
Annex 1. The largest Gains and Declines in FH Press Freedom Scores, 2009—2013 
 
-17
-16
-16
-15
-13
-12
-12
-11
-11
-10
-8
-7
-7
-6
-6
-6
-6
-5
-5
-5
-5
-5
-5
-5
-5
-5
-5
-5
-5
-5
5
5
6
6
6
7
7
8
9
9
10
11
11
12
12
16
25
32
32
-20 -10 0 10 20 30 40
Greece
Central African Republic
Guinea-Bissau
Mali
Turkey
Egypt
Kazakhstan
Panama
Thailand
Bolivia
Cambodia
Jordan
Nicaragua
Sudan
Tanzania
Algeria
Colombia
Sierra Leone
Kyrgyzstan
Senegal
Afghanistan
Zimbabwe
Moldova
Burma (Myanmar)
Tunisia
Largest Gaines and Declines in Press Freedom Scores 2009--2013
